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VOLUME 72 WINTER 1998 NUMBER 1
IN PRAISE OF ANTITRUST LITIGATION:
THE SECOND ANNUAL BERNSTEIN
LECTURE
STEPHEN CALKINS*
It is an honor to serve as the second annual Bernstein lec-
turer.' Lew Bernstein was an antitrust legend. I had the privi-
lege to learn from Mr. Bernstein as a student of trial practice
many years ago, and it is a great privilege now to share some
ideas as part of honoring his memory.
In preparing for today's remarks, I chatted with two long-
time Antitrust Division colleagues of Mr. Bernstein, Bernard
Hollander and Raymond Carlson. Both reveled in remembering
their friend and inspirational leader.2 Mr. Carlson used a mod-
em comparison: "He was the best Michael Jordan-type lawyer
that I've ever known." Mr. Bernstein was kind to everyone, Mr.
Carlson continued: "He was the guy to work for in the Antitrust
Division. I loved him, and I loved doing what I was doing. That
was the best career that anyone could have had."
Careers in government antitrust agencies are different now.
Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School. Professor Calkins was
General Counsel of the Federal Trade Commission when he delivered this address,
which has been slightly revised for publication, but he was not speaking for the
Commission or any individual Commissioner. Thanks for assistance go to Cynthia
Hogue Levy and the several other lawyers in the FTC's Office of the General Coun-
sel who helped prepare and revise the address, and to lichelle Fisher for additional
research.
1 It also is an honor to be introduced by Dean Rudolph Hasl, who taught me
much about law school administration when I served a stint as an interim dean.
2 Telephone Interview with Bernard Hollander (Apr. 1997); Telephone Inter-
view with Raymond Carlson (Apr. 1997).
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Lew Bernstein was an antitrust litigator; today, many agency
antitrust lawyers are more antitrust regulators.3 For instance,
from 1960, when Mr. Bernstein became chief of the Antitrust
Division's Special Litigation Section, through 1977 (when he re-
tired) civil antitrust cases filed in the federal district courts av-
eraged 43 a year,4 as follows:
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968
59 40 41 39 41 33 32 36 40
1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
39 54 52 72 42 33 37 45 34
In the decade starting ten years later (1987-1996) the com-
parable average was only 16 cases--roughly one-third of the
volume during Lew Bernstein's tenure-with annual filings as
follows:
' See, e.g., Harry First, Is Antitrust "Law"?, 10 ANTITRUST 9, 9-10 (Fall 1995)
(discussing the increased use of consent decrees under the current administration);
James L. Freeze, United States v. Western Electric Co.: The Deference Difference, 21
CAP. U. L. REV. 321, 321 (1992) (indicating that the use of consent decrees has be-
come the preferred means of disposing of antitrust litigation); David S. Konczal, Ru-
ing Rufo: Ramifications of a Lenient Standard for Modifying Antitrust Consent De-
crees and an Alternative, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 130, 131 (1996); A. Douglas
Melamed, Antitrust: The New Regulation, 10 ANTITRUST 13, 13 (Fall 1995) ("[Tihe
evolution of antitrust into a form of regulation is in part a by-product of the increas-
ing use of consent decrees as the primary means of antitrust enforcement."); Ste-
phen J. Squeri, Government Investigation and Enforcement: Antitrust Division, in 2
36TH ANN. ANTITRUST L. INST. 519, 564 (1995) (indicating roughly 70 percent of all
Antitrust Division civil complaints are resolved by consent decree); Mary Lou Step-
toe and David Balto, The FTC's Use of Innovative Merger Remedies, 10 ANTITRUST
16, 16 (Fall 1995) (noting a threefold increase in the number of consent decrees en-
tered by the FTC since 1990); Michael L. Weiner, Antitrust and the Rise of the Regu-
latory Consent Decree, 10 ANTITRUST 4, 8 (Fall 1995) (noting the practical impor-
tance of the trend toward consent decree resolutions); see also infra note 4 and text
accompanying note 5. Antitrust as regulation is also thoughtfully explored in a draft
paper I received after largely completing this revision, Spencer Weber Waller,
Prosecution by Regulation: The Changing Nature of Antitrust Enforcement (on file
with author).
' These figures are based on fiscal year workload statistics (October 1 - Septem-
ber 30), supplied by the Department of Justice Antitrust Division ("DOJ"), Office of
Legal Procedure. For more recent DOJ workload statistics, see 68 Antitrust & Trade
Reg. Rep. (BNA) 146 (1995) (reporting data for FY 1985-1994); 70 Antitrust & Trade
Reg. Rep. (BNA) 299 (1996) (reporting data for FY 1986-1995); 72 Antitrust & Trade
Reg. Rep. (BNA) 117 (1997) (reporting data for FY 1987-1996).
See supra note 4.
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1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
15 11 6 14 17 12 9 21 24 29
Although there has been a recent uptick, the overall decline is
striking.
Litigation has received something of a bad name. It is tre-
mendously costly for defendants and plaintiffs-including Gov-
ernment plaintiffs-alike. Partly as a result, consent decrees are
now widely understood to be the likely outcome of government
antitrust investigations that are not unilaterally terminated. In
addition, Alternative Dispute Resolution ("ADR") continues to be
popular within the government and without.'
This trend is driven by more than mere economizing. Anti-
trust officials and observers increasingly recognize that mergers
and other transactions can yield efficiencies likely to redound to
the benefit of consumers, the general economy, and international
competitiveness.! With certain exceptions, those same enforcers
6 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,988, 61 Fed. Reg. 4729 (1996) (requiring govern-
ment litigation counsel to make reasonable attempts to resolve disputes using alter-
native methods of resolving disputes); Exec. Order No. 12,778, 56 Fed. Reg. 55195
(1991) (same); Atty. Gen. Order No. OBD 1160.1, Promoting the Broader Appropri-
ate Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution Techniques (Apr. 6, 1995) (establishing Al-
ternative Dispute Resolution program in the Department of Justice to make the
agency more efficient in its handling of roughly 170,000 civil justice matters each
year); Peter Anderson, Trends in Alternative Dispute Resolution since 1990: An ALI-
ABA 50th Anniversary Special Article, 8 PRAC. LITIGATOR 7, 8, 13 (1997) (describing
acceptance of ADR methods by courts, clients, and the bar); Miriam R. Arfin, The
Benefits of Alternative Dispute Resolution in Intellectual Property Disputes, 17
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 893, 896 n.8, 898-901 (1995) (stating that ADR is par-
ticularly well-suited to resolving intellectual property conflicts); Lois J. Schiffer &
Robin L. Juni, Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Department of Justice, 11 NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV'T 11, 11-12 (1996) (explaining how ADR is used in the Environ-
mental Division, including the factors that make ADR useful in certain cases); Ste-
ven Schwartz, The Business and Legal Communities Look to ADR, 51 DISP. RESOL.
J. 34 (1996) (discussing the use of ADR as a means to resolve disputes cheaper,
faster, and more amicably); Peter R. Steenland, Jr. & Peter A. Appel, The Ongoing
Role of Alternative Dispute Resolution in Federal Government Litigation, 27 U. TOL.
L. REV. 805, 806 (1996) (stating that Attorney General Janet Reno recently
"announced a policy of vigorously encouraging ADR within the Justice Department"
by "creat[ing] the position of Senior Counsel for ADR within the Department").
7 See generally 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
13,104 (1997) (revising efficiencies section of horizontal merger guidelines); Her-
bert Hovenkamp, Merger Actions for Damages, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 937, 942 (1984)
("Efficiency created by a merger generally increases social welfare."). But see Alan
A. Fisher & Robert H. Lande, Efficiency Considerations in Merger Enforcement, 71
CALIF. L. REV. 1582, 1603-04 (1983) (noting that although some mergers result in
efficiencies, other mergers may not yield efficiencies, but, rather, higher overall
1998]
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and observers are largely untroubled by increases in the size of
firms.8 If size by itself is not a matter of concern, and if mergers
and other transactions are likely to yield substantial efficiencies,
it follows easily that enforcers should work creatively with pri-
vate counsel to preserve as much of the proposed transactions
and arrangements as is consistent with preventing discrete,
specific antitrust harm.9 Much of merger enforcement is the
surgical fine-tuning of proposed transactions to excise or isolate
problematic parts while preserving as much as possible of the
whole.'0
The courtroom is a poor place to practice such surgery. It is
settled law that once a violation has been proven, the preferred
remedy is a complete injunction." At best, however, a complete
injunction risks losing whatever efficiency benefits a proposed
transaction might have offered. Alternatively, the specter of de-
costs).8 C.f, e.g., Ciba-Geigy Ltd., C-3725 (Consent Order, Mar. 24, 1997), reprinted in
5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 24,182 (1997) (permitting a $63 billion merger of two
leading pharmaceutical and chemical firms pursuant to a consent agreement requir-
ing, inter alia, the licensing of specified gene therapy technology and patent rights
to a competitor and the divestiture of the acquirer's pet flea control and $780 million
corn herbicide businesses); Baxter Int'l, Inc., C-3726 (Consent Order, Mar. 24, 1997),
reprinted in 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 24,184 (1996) (permitting a $463 million ac-
quisition when acquirer agreed to divest assets and license products under devel-
opment; although the acquisition created the largest manufacturer of plasma prod-
ucts in the world); Adam Bryant, McDonnell Douglas-Boeing Merger Wins F.T.C.
Approval: FTC Says Deal Isn't Threat to Competitors, N.Y. TIMEs, July 2, 1997, at
D-3; Steven Pearistein, Boeing Free to Purchase McDonnell, WASH. POST, July 2,
1997, at A-i; John R. Wilke & Jeff Cole, Boeing, McDonnell Douglas Deal Gains
U.S. Antitrust Clearance, WALL ST. J., July 2, 1997, at B-4 (discussing unconditional
federal antitrust regulators' clearing of Boeing's planned $14 billion acquisition of
McDonnell Douglas).
9 The connection between economic sophistication and an interest in consent
decrees that makes government more regulatory is explicated in Melamed, supra
note 3, at 15.
10 See Steptoe & Balto, supra note 3, at 16. The Antitrust Division's March 1996
report, Opening Markets and Protecting Competition for America's Businesses and
Consumers: Goals and Achievements of the Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of
Justice (Mar. 27, 1996), detailed that of 60 mergers questioned by the Division since
the start of fiscal year 1993, "27 were formally challenged by the Division in court,
four of which were litigated, and 20 of which were restructured to alleviate the
threat of competition. This high number of restructured transactions reflects the
Division's practice, wherever possible, to resolve its competition concerns by agree-
ing with the parties on restructuring." Id. at 22.
"See FTC v. PPG Indus., Inc., 798 F.2d 1500, 1502 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (finding
that the trial court should have entered a preliminary injunction instead of a "hold
separate order" when the agency established a strong likelihood of success on the
merits of a Clayton Act Section 7 claim).
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priving society of those benefits may dissuade a court from find-
ing a violation in the first place, which (if an agency has chosen a
case well) will likely lead to anticompetitive results. The all-or-
nothing nature of litigation makes litigation cowards of us all.
This is an occasion to celebrate the virtues of antitrust liti-
gation rather than settlement, however." In particular, three
virtues of litigation stand out: (1) litigation is important because
some judicial decisions are wrong; (2) litigation is important to
the evolution of the law; and (3) litigation is important for cer-
tainty and predictability.
I. LITIGATION IS IMPORTANT BECAUSE SOME DECISIONS ARE
WRONG
Courts are judges; judges are people; and people make mis-
takes. Some judicial decisions are simply wrong. Although it
may seem paradoxical, the certainty that courts will err is a rea-
son to champion litigation.
A. Letting the Government Afford to Lose
No responsible entity lightly files a lawsuit, and governmen-
tal entities can be among the most responsible. Governmental
antitrust agencies should, and do, think long and hard before
going to court.
In part, this care is simply good government. A court com-
plaint represents a commitment of substantial agency resources.
It also imposes costs on the defendant, the judicial system, and
third parties; governmental officials should impose such costs
with care. Any court complaint can roil the capital markets and
prevent companies from engaging in normal activities that might
benefit consumers. Governmental agencies also hesitate to liti-
gate because of fear of defeat. Courtroom setbacks can demoral-
ize agency staff, raise questions in the eyes of observers, and im-
pose political costs. Few agency annual reports boast about the
well-fought loss, and, in an era in which governmental account-
ability is fashionable, it is challenging to characterize losses as
2Cf. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF HAMLET, PRINCE OF DENMARK,
act I, sc. i.
's For an appreciation of the Antitrust Division as an economic regulator, see E.
Thomas Sullivan, The Antitrust Division as a Regulatory Agency: An Enforcement
Policy in Transition, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 997 (1986); see also supra note 3 and accom-
panying text.
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accomplishments. 4
All too often, agencies worry about their win rates. Legal
newspapers regularly report the Solicitor General's success
rate;15 the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") and the Antitrust
Division of the Department of Justice boast about the rate at
which merger challenges are successfully resolved; 6 and general
counsels who are nominated for higher office like to claim that
their agency won a high percentage of its cases. 7 Everyone
wants a good batting average. Unfortunately, a single loss can
ruin a good batting average compiled with few at-bats. It is one
thing to lose one of many cases; it is considerably more devastat-
ing to lose a third, half, or more of one's cases. One advantage of
regularly litigating is that the government can afford to lose.
Consider FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp." That case in-
volved the FTC's challenge to the proposed merger of the two
largest (and, coincidentally, nonprofit) hospitals in Grand Rap-
ids, Michigan. 9 The district court ruled in the Commission's fa-
vor on virtually every issue: product markets ("general acute
14 The Federal Trade Commission's Strategic Plan includes the goals of saving
consumers $1 billion by preventing anticompetitive mergers, 1997-2002, and of
achieving "a positive result (including consent orders, litigation victories, and, for
mergers, transactions abandoned after recommendation of a complaint) in at least
80% of those cases." The FTC's strategic plan under the Government Performance
and Results Act: F4 1997-2002 (June 1997) (visited Jan. 14, 1998)
<http://www.ftc.gov/opp/gprayny-011>. "Each year" the agency is supposed to
"assess the deterrence value and precedential significance of the enforcement ac-
tions brought during the year." Id.
15 See, e.g., Tony Mauro, Days' Rate; Solicitor General Has Subpar Season,
LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 4, 1995, at 1 (noting the 1994 term Solicitor General's win rate
of 64% compared to 75% in the most recent term for which the office kept statistics
(1992)).
'6 See, e.g., Commissioner Mary L. Azcuenaga, Mergers: A View From the Fed-
eral Trade Commission, Remarks before the Practicing Law Institute's 25th Annual
Advanced Antitrust Seminar, at 3 (Mar. 15, 1995) (visited Jan. 14, 1998) <http://
www.ftc.gov/speeches/azcuenaga/pli.htm> ("This is a strong record that I believe
speaks well for our case selection criteria and, of course, the considerable abilities of
the Commission's litigating staff.").
17 When Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") Chairman Hundt lauded
the proposed elevation of FCC General Counsel William Kennard to Chairman, he
boasted that "Bill has dramatically improved the agency's win record in the Court of
Appeals." Statement by Chairman Hundt on Designation of William Kennard as
Next Chairman of FCC (Aug. 6, 1997) (visited Jan. 14, 1998) <httpl/
www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Hundt/ken-reh.htm>.
18 946 F. Supp 1285 (W.D. Mich. 1996), affd, 121 F.3d 708 (6th Cir. 1997) (per
curiam). Lest there be any doubt, I am a thoroughly biased observer of this litiga-
tion, since mine was the first name on all the briefs filed on the losing side.
19 Butterworth, 946 F. Supp. at 1288.
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care inpatient hospital services" and "primary care inpatient
hospital services");" geographic markets ("the Greater Kent
County area" for general acute care inpatient hospital services,
and "the 'immediate Grand Rapids Area' " for primary care in-
patient hospital services);2' market concentration (the combined
firms would control 47 to 65 percent of general acute care inpa-
tient services, and 65-70 percent of primary care inpatient serv-
ices);' and entry barriers ("defendants concede that there are
substantial barriers to new entry into the relevant market").'
The court specifically concluded that the Commission had estab-
lished a prima facie violation of Section 7,' and that "[t]here is
no question but that the FTC has demonstrated that the merged
entity would have substantial market power in two relevant
markets."'
In spite of this, the court denied the FTC's request for a pre-
liminary injunction." The court pointed to a variety of factors,
including especially "the involvement of prominent community
and business leaders on the boards of these [nonprofit] hospitals"
20 I& at 1291.
21 Id. at 1291-93.
2See id. at 1294. There were four large general acute care hospitals in the geo-
graphic market pre-merger: (1) Butterworth Hospital (529 general acute care beds);
(2) Blodgett Memorial Medical Center (328 general acute care beds); (3) St. Mary's
Hospital, a Catholic hospital (150 general acute care beds); and (4) Metropolitan
Hospital, an osteopathic hospital (101 general acute care beds). See id. at 1288. Also
included in the geographic market, though of lesser competitive significance due to
their size and location, were five smaller hospitals, located in rural areas in counties
adjoining Kent County, Michigan. See id. at 1291. The FTC argued that the merging
hospitals would control 47-65% of the market for general acute care inpatient hospi-
tal services (i.e., a cluster of services that are necessary to meet the needs of inpa-
tients, such as operating rooms, anesthesia, intensive care capabilities, 24-hour
nursing care, lodging, and pharmaceuticals) in the geographic market (depending on
whether market share is measured by licensed beds, discharges or inpatient reve-
nues). The post-merger Herfindahl-Hirschman Index ("HI-I ) would range from
2767 to 4521, reflecting an increase of between 1064 and 1889 points. See id. at
1294. The agency further contended that the merged entity would control between
65 and 70% of a second product market, the market for primary care inpatient hos-
pital services (i.e., basic or less complex services available at most general acute
care hospitals, including normal childbirth, gynecology, pediatrics, general medi-
cine, and general surgical services). See id 'The post-merger Hi [in that market]
would rise to a number between 4506 and 5079, reflecting an increase of from 1675
to 2001 points." Id. The defendants did not contest these concentration calculations.
See id.
2Id. at 1297.
21 See id. at 1294.
2Id- at 1294, 1302.26 See id at 1303.
1998]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
and the hospitals' so-called "Community Commitment."27 That
"commitment" was repackaged as a court order that, among
other things, froze hospital charges for three years, imposed a
level reimbursement arrangement on the large health mainte-
nance organizations, and limited hospital margins "in perpetu-
ity" to the average of the top quartile nationally.' In addition,
the court noted that, although it refrained from "engag[ing] in a
detailed evaluation of the competing views" of efficiencies, it was
persuaded that the merger would lead to unspecified efficiencies
"in excess of $100 million."29 This amount would be "passed on to
consumers" one way or another because "of defendants' nonprofit
status and the Community Commitment,"3 and it would "enable
the board of directors ... to continue the quest for establishment
of world-class health facilities in West Michigan, a course the
Court finds clearly and unequivocally would ultimately be in the
best interests of the consuming public as a whole." 1
Trying my best to wear my objective law professor hat, this
decision is, with all due respect, terribly misguided.32 Although
the court indicated that the nonprofit status was "not a disposi-
tive consideration,"33 the opinion could be misread to create an
effective exemption for nonprofits. The court's faith in nonprofit
leadership of the hospitals is strikingly evidenced by its obser-
vation that reduction of the hospitals' "above-average profit
margins" would not advantage the public because profits are re-
invested to benefit consumers.Y If nonprofit status immunizes
27 Id. at 1297. The court found persuasive hospital service pricing data indicat-
ing that "high market concentration among nonprofit hospitals does not correlate
positively with higher prices." Id. at 1295. The defendant hospitals offered evidence
that higher hospital concentration is associated with lower hospital prices. The
hospitals claimed that this called into question the traditional presumption that a
significant increase in market concentration resulting from a merger will lead to
higher prices, and the court was impressed. See id. at 1295-97. This Michigan resi-
dent cannot resist observing that the correlation seems more likely to result from
the much higher costs of providing hospital services in Detroit, where there are sev-
eral hospitals, than in the rural out-state regions of Michigan, where there are few.
Id. at 1305-06 (Exhibit A).
29 Id. at 1301.OId.
31 Id. at 1302.
The district court opinion is criticized in a new article, Thomas L. Greaney,
Night Landings on an Aircraft Carrier: Hospital Mergers and Antitrust Law, 23 AM.
J.L. & MLED. 191, 212-14 (1997).
Butterworth, 946 F. Supp. at 1297.
Id. at 1299 ("With nonprofit hospitals ... reduced operating margins simply
mean less funds to reinvest in each hospital. Such reinvestment necessarily results
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hospitals from antitrust scrutiny, a full eighty-five percent of all
hospitals have achieved an antitrust exemption without even
petitioning Congress. 5 Beyond that, the court's only basis for
entering the Community Commitment as a court order must
have been that it found a violation; but then, having found a
violation, the remedy was court-ordered perpetual rate regula-
tion rather than the traditional remedies under the Clayton Act,
viz., enjoining the merger or requiring the divestiture of assets to
mitigate any anticompetitive effects from the merger.36 If any
lesson has been well-learned by economists and even politicians,
it is that regulation is a poor substitute for competition; yet,
here, the court was establishing itself as a small regulatory body
without any statutory support for doing so. Any hope that the
court would be a singularly effective rate regulator was belied by
the court's initial decree, which directly lessened competition by
ending discounts to certain managed care plans and by freezing
rates when further decreases seemed quite possible.
Although Butterworth was a singularly misguided opinion,
the decision to appeal it was not without risk. An unfavorable
but unaffirmed district court opinion is merely that; an affirmed
opinion is stronger-and there was risk that a court of appeals
could adopt some of the lower court's reasoning as its own. A
private litigant, and particularly one not regularly involved in
litigation, may weigh the chance of winning against legal fees. A
government agency must also consider the likely development of
the law, particularly if this would be one of very few opinions.
In the end the Commission did appeal Butterworth, and a
seemingly disinterested United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court in an unpublished per
curiam opinion.3 The court did little more than add an appellate
expression of non-objection to the district court's decision. None-
theless, the state of hospital merger law is worse than it was be-
fore the FTC brought its case, and worse than it would have been
in benefits to consumers in the form of expanded and improved services.").
' See Demise of the Not-For-Profit has been Greatly Exaggerated, MOD.
HEALTHCARE Dec. 23-30, 1996, at 33.
" One irony lost on the court was that the efficiency justification was grounded
on the view that the merger was the only way to prevent a "medical arms race" that
would "continue] at great expense to defendants and ultimately to consumers." But-
terworth, 946 F. Supp. at 1301. The combatants in this wasteful arms race were, of
course, the same public-spirited guardians against wasteful practices in whom the
court showed such confidence.
See FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 121 F.3d 708 (6th Cir. 1997).
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had the FTC not appealed. 8 The hospitals' lawyer explained
that the courts had concluded that "U]ust because there's an in-
crease in market power doesn't mean the market power will be
exercised;"39 yet if the FTC, having shown that a merger will
significantly increase market power, is not entitled to a prelimi-
nary injunction, the standard for awarding a preliminary in-
junction has been dramatically raised."0 I personally wish that
the Commission had sought certiorari, in case it could interest
the Supreme Court in righting this rather clear wrong, but the
Commission declined to do so.4'
One cannot know the cost of the unhappy Butterworth story
without knowing whether it will turn out to be merely one of a
38 Hospitals are reportedly already mimicking the "Community Commitment" in
attempts to use a price-regulation approach to substitute for competition. See Gov-
ernment's Prognosis for Future Health Care Mergers, FTC: WATCH No. 486, at 1, 3
(Oct. 13, 1997) (merging hospitals in Erie, Pennsylvania, are touting " 'Our Com-
mitment to the Community' ... which closely tracks the Butterworth/Blodgett com-
mitment that so impressed the federal district court judge in that case").
' FTC'S Failure to Halt Grand Rapids Hospital Merger Won't Be Overturned,
73 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 49, 50 (July 17, 1997) (remarks of William G.
Kopit).
40 It used to be settled law that the FTC was entitled to a preliminary injunction
whenever it had "raise[d] 'questions going to the merits so serious, substantial, diffi-
cult and doubtful as to make them fair ground for thorough investigation, study, de-
liberation and determination by the FTC in the first instance and ultimately by the
Court of Appeals.' " FTC v. National Tea Co., 603 F.2d 694, 698 (8th Cir. 1979)
(quoting and endorsing magistrate). Although the Butterworth court purported to
apply this standard, its decision strips the standard of all meaning.
Not only did the Commission not seek certiorari, it dismissed its pending
administrative case reviewing the same merger. The Commission gave no explana-
tion for its decision, but merely quoted the applicable standards. 5 Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) 24,334, at 24,168 (Sept. 25, 1997) ("After considering the pleadings and
each of these five factors, the Commission has determined that further administra-
tive litigation is not in the public interest."). Press reports speculate that the Com-
mission acted in response to Congressional pressure:
It didn't help the federal government's case that Amway, one of the city's
largest employers, stood firmly behind the merger. Amway's retired co-
founder Richard DeVos, also former Chairman of the Board at Butter-
worth, reportedly played a key role in the creation of a Senate appropria-
tions rider that, if enacted, would have prohibited the Federal Trade
Commission from continuing to challenge the merger.
Government's Prognosis for Future Health Care Mergers, FTC: WATCH No. 486, at 2
(Oct. 13, 1997); Butterworth/Blodgett Hospital Merger Challenge Dropped, FTC:
WATCH No. 485 (Sept. 29, 1997) (noting "Congressional unhappiness"); cf. Senate
Judiciary Panel Members Oppose Rider on FTC Review of Hospital Merger, 73 Anti-
trust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 307 (Sept. 25, 1997) (S. 1022, passed by the Senate,
would have prevented the FTC from using appropriate funds to continue the admin-
istrative adjudication of the Butterworth-Blodgett hospital merger).
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series of cases wrestling with hospital merger issues, or, rather,
one of only a handful. When a particular wrongly-decided appel-
late opinion is just one of many opinions addressing an issue, the
cost of defeat may be modest. Where, however, an appellate de-
feat might be the only opinion to address an issue for years to
come, the risks are much higher. A series of cases creates oppor-
tunities to file appeals that an agency otherwise might not dare,
and, of course, to file somewhat risky but meritorious cases in
the first place.
B. Burying Cases in the Sands of Time
Law students sometimes have a vision of the legal system as
a process by which firm principles are established in cases that
endure until squarely reversed or clearly limited. Happily, the
real world does not work that way. Instead, judicial mistakes
can be buried by passage of time. Thus, extensive litigation,
most of which presumably will have correct outcomes, can serve
to dilute the impact of wrongly-decided cases. Three examples
illustrate the point:
1. Von's Grocery42
Von's Grocery was the case that condemned a merger be-
tween the third and sixth largest retail grocery chains in a met-
ropolitan area, a merger that would have resulted in a combined
market share of only seven and one-half percent. In reversing
the lower court's denial of the Government's motion to enjoin the
merger, the Court expressed alarm at the continuing trend to-
ward increased concentration in the Los Angeles grocery store
market.' Commentators have fatally undermined the preceden-
tial value of Von's Grocery by mocking its undue concern for
"'small dealers and worthy men' "4 and, alternatively, its failure
actually to serve their interests.45
' United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
43 See id. at 276.
Id. at 274 (quoting United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S.
290, 323 (1897)).
. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH
ITSELF 198-218 (1978); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE
LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 451-52 (1994). Judge Bork attacked both
Von's Grocery and Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962). The Court
in Brown Shoe relied heavily on the legislative history of the 1950 Celler-Kefauver
Amendments to Section 7 of the Clayton Act, which suggested that Congress may
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The decision in Von's Grocery was handed down thirty years
ago, and since then, the Court has never reversed nor even ex-
pressly limited it. Yet neither courts nor antitrust practitioners
view it as good law today. The change was accomplished by the
steady accretion of cases inconsistent with Von's Grocery.46
Eventually, so many lower courts had ignored Von's Grocery that
antitrust advisors became comfortable also ignoring it.47
Those more recent cases built on the more sophisticated
competitive analysis that has evolved in antitrust case law over
the intervening years. The evolution was triggered or at least
propelled forward by the 1982 Merger Guideline revisions led by
Assistant Attorney General William Baxter. In a masterstroke,
General Baxter switched from traditional four-firm concentra-
tion ratios48 to the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index.49 Since the
have been more concerned with the welfare of small businesses and with an alleged
"rising tide of concentration" in many American markets than it was with specific
consumer prices. See, e.g., 96 CONG. REC. 1643-45 (1950) (remarks of Senator
O'Mahoney); 95 CONG. REC. 11496 (1949) (remarks of Representative Boggs); see
also Derek Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Econom-
ics, 74 HARV. L. REV. 226, 234 (1960); Herbert Hovenkamp, Derek Bok and the
Merger of Law and Economics, 21 J.L. REFORM 515 (1988); Herbert Hovenkamp,
Distributive Justice and the Antitrust Laws, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 23-27 (1982).
See, e.g., Hospital Corp. of Am. v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381, 1386 (7th Cir. 1986);
Lunkenheimer Co. v. Condec Corp., 268 F. Supp. 667, 671 (S.D.N.Y. 1967)
(upholding a merger with combined shares of less than 5% in unconcentrated bronze
valve market, with no showing of high entry barriers; distinguishing Von's Grocery
as emphasizing accelerating concentration).
The most important developments that cast doubt ... on Brown Shoe and
Von's Grocery, [370 U.S. 294 (1962)] are found in other cases, where the
Supreme Court, echoed by lower courts, has said repeatedly that the eco-
nomic concept of competition, rather than any desire to preserve rivals as
such, is the lodestar that shall guide the contemporary application of the
antitrust laws, not excluding the Clayton Act.
Hospital Corp., 807 F.2d at 1386. Although the Supreme Court has never reversed
Von's Grocery, its opinions in United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486
(1974) (sustaining merger in spite of facially high market shares), and Cargill, Inc.
v. Montfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 116 n.11 (1986) (noting "considerable disa-
greement" about whether "Congress intended the courts to apply § 7 so as to keep
small competitors in business at the expense of efficiency"), gave comfort to those
who rejected Von's Grocery.
47 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 326-27
(4th ed. 1997) [hereinafter "1997 ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS"] (more recent
decisions have based presumptions of illegality on "very high" market shares, and
"[courts have been more receptive than in the past to non-market share evidence").
' Concentration ratios measure the portion of the market accounted for by a
given number of the leading firms (e.g., the top two, four, or eight firms). Four-firm
concentration ratios were used in the Department of Justice's 1968 Guidelines to
identify threshold concentration levels that were likely to result in an enforcement
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Guidelines supplied the only yardstick with which to identify
troubling concentration patterns, courts were compelled to com-
pare the concentration figures from litigated cases to the Guide-
lines' thresholds-a comparison which, among other things,
served to isolate Von's Grocery and similar cases."
2. Utah Pie5
Utah Pie applied the Robinson-Patman Act to strike down
price discrimination that led to a "deteriorating price struc-
ture."52 In Utah Pie, the Court condemned the pricing activities
of three wholesale pie baking companies that operated in several
geographic markets. There was an intense price war in the Salt
Lake City area (the market in which the small plaintiff operated)
and the defendants sold pies at lower prices than they sold the
same pies in other cities. The plaintiff made a profit throughout
the entire time period that was at issue in the litigation,53 and
always had a market share greater than that of any of the three
action.
9 The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index ("Hill") is calculated by summing the
squares of the individual market shares of all the firms included in the relevant
market. Unlike traditional concentration ratios, the HHI includes the shares of all
firms in the market, while assigning little significance to small shares. The HI also
emphasizes the asymmetry in the size distribution of the firms in the market. "The
HHI is premised upon the economic principle that both the distribution of market
shares among the leading firms and the composition of the market outside the
leading firms are significant in assessing the likelihood of tacit collusion or interde-
pendent, noncompetitive conduct in a market." FTC v. Bass Bros. Enters., 1984-1
Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,041, at 68,609 (N.D. Ohio 1984).
' See generally Stephen Calkins, The New Merger Guidelines and the Herfin-
dahl-Hirschman Index, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 402, 410-15 (1983) (discussing the use of
HHI by courts). Current merger policy with respect to efficiency, moreover, has
moved away from the concerns expressed in the legislative history of the 1950
amendments to Section 7 of the Clayton Act and from the early Supreme Court de-
cisions interpreting those amendments. See 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 4
Trade Reg. Rep. (CCE) 13,104 (1997) (revising the efficiencies section of horizontal
merger guidelines).I Utah Pie Corp. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967).
52 Id. at 690. The case also involved a conspiracy charge; however, the jury did
not find a Sherman Act violation. The jury in Utah Pie did find a Robinson-Patman
violation, but the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding insufficient evi-
dence that the geographic price discriminations could have caused the requisite in-
jury to competition. Continental Baking Co. v. Utah Pie Corp., 349 F.2d 122, 150-53,
155 (10th Cir. 1965). The Robinson-Patman Section 2(a) claim was before the Su-
preme Court. See Utah Pie, 386 U.S. at 687-88. The Court reversed and remanded.
See id. at 704.
The Court of Appeals placed heavy emphasis on this fact. See Utah Pie, 349
F.2d at 129.
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defendants. Nonetheless, the Court cited a "drastically declining
price structure"' as evidence of defendants' predation.55 The
Robinson-Patman Act was thus used to condemn healthy com-
petition by multi-market sellers.
Even before the Supreme Court revisited Robinson-Patman
Act standards for competitive injury more than 25 years later, in
Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., Utah
Pie had been sapped of its precedential vitality. Once again a
guideline played a key role in this process, this time through a
standard propounded by Professors Areeda and Turner.57 They
criticized Utah Pie as condemning pro-competitive price-
cutting,5 and advocated cost-based pricing tests. Even without
much assistance from the Supreme Court,59 a bumper crop of
lower court predatory pricing decisions pledged allegiance to
some form of the cost-based pricing gospel. Legal advisors even-
tually became comfortably confident that Utah Pie was no longer
good law.6" Once again, so many cases had ignored a wrongly-
decided precedent that it was eliminated in effect if not reversed
in fact.
3. Appalachian Coals"'
Appalachian Coals was the depression-era case that could
be read as substantially cutting back on Sherman Act coverage of
price-fixing. In Appalachian Coals, 137 competing coal produc-
ers created an exclusive joint selling agency which was in-
structed to sell all of the members' coal at the highest price that
it was able to obtain. The agency classified the coal, marketed it,
and distributed the proceeds to the participants. Because coal is
", Utah Pie, 386 U.S. at 703.
See id. at 690.
6 509 U.S. 209 (1993).
57 See Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Practices Un-
der Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1975).
See id. at 728.
The Court's next foray into predatory pricing, Matsushita Electric Industrial
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986), mentioned Utah Pie only as a
strained "see" cite to support the footnoted proposition that " 'predatory pricing'
means pricing below some appropriate measure of cost." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at
584-85 n.8.
See ABA ANTITRUST SEcTION, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 232-33 (2d ed.
1984) (hereinafter "1984 ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS"] ("Lower court decisions
since Utah Pie have focused principally on whether the price is 'below cost' ....").61 Appalachian Coals Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933).
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fungible, the agency necessarily charged the same price for each
producer's coal, and effectively fixed prices. The Court upheld
the joint endeavor, holding that the depressed market conditions
justified the joint sales activities, and that there appeared to be
little likelihood that the coal producers were reducing output and
obtaining higher prices. Commentators criticized the Court's
opinion as ignoring economic reality and responding too strongly
to depression-era concerns.62 Although the Supreme Court never
squarely reversed the decision,' observers came to view Appala-
chian Coals-at least in its own terms '-as a relic of a special
time in America's history.' It became a relic only because a
whole series of cases treated it as one.
By itself, the passage of time can raise questions about the
continued vitality of aged precedents. By itself, however, time
can only raise doubts. If the Supreme Court is not going to re-
verse itself, only a series of lower court decisions, working to-
gether, can give unhappy opinions the proper burial they de-
serve.
C. Wrong-Headed Cases Attract Criticism
Wrong decisions in litigated cases attract criticism, which
can lead to the undoing of an ill-advised principle. As Chief
Justice Stone wrote, " 'the only protection against unwise deci-
sions, and even judicial usurpation, is careful scrutiny of their
action and fearless comment upon it.' "6" Criticism can be leveled
See generally PHILIP AREEDA & LOUIS KAPLOW, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 190
(5th ed. 1997) ("Appalachian Coals is often regarded today as an aberration of the
1930s, when competition was often deemphasized."); RICHARD A. POSNER & FRANK
H. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST 126 (2d ed. 1981) (explaining that the outcome in Ap-
palachian Coals was because faith in policy of competition during the depression
era was "deeply shaken"); John J. Flynn & James F. Ponsoldt, Legal Reasoning and
the Jurisprudence of Vertical Restraints: The Limitations of Neoclassical Economic
Analysis in the Resolution of Antitrust Disputes, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1125, 1128 n.11
(1987).
6 Cf. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 214 (1940)
(Appalachian Coals "is not in point").
For ruminations about whether the decision can be rationalized with modem
joint venture analysis through an approach different than the courts, see, e.g.,
HOVENKAMP, supra note 45, at 188; STEPHEN F. ROSS, PRINCIPLES OF ANTITRUST
LAW 132-33 (1993).
eSee supra note 62 and accompanying text. But cf. Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg.
Co. v. Sealy, Inc., 585 F.2d 821, 838 (7th Cir. 1978) (Appalachian Coals relied upon
to uphold national accounts program).
1960 SUP. CT. REV. ii. Starting two years later, the Supreme Court Review
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in dissents and in academic commentary.
Antitrust's most famous dissent was Justice Stewart's in
Von's Grocery, where he wrote that the "sole consistency" that he
could find among a line of cases "is that in litigation under § 7,
the Government always wins."67 Von's was on shaky ground
from its date of issuance.
Litigated decisions also attract academic comment and at-
tack. Utah Pie, which is mentioned above, was savagely criti-
cized by Ward Bowman, who labeled it "the most anticompetitive
antitrust decision of the decade" (which he added was "no mean
achievement"):'
The Supreme Court shows a growing determination in its anti-
trust decisions to convert laws designed to promote competition
into laws which regulate or hamper the competitive process.
Succeeding interpretations of the Clayton and Robinson-Patman
Acts-and, by infectious contamination, the Sherman Act-
demonstrate an increasingly apparent disregard for the central
purpose of antitrust, the promotion of consumer welfare
through the promotion of a competitive market process. Now, in
Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., the Supreme Court has
used section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act to strike directly
at price competition itself.
69
From the moment Professor Bowman published his brutal
assault on Utah Pie, it was vulnerable. Later, Professors Areeda
and Turner contributed their bright-line alternative, and Utah
Pie was largely consigned to history. Eventually, the Supreme
Court ratified the alternative view. Noting the extensive criti-
switched to a similar sentiment expressed by Justice Felix Frankfurter: "'Judges as
persons, or courts as institutions, are entitled to no greater immunity from criticism
than other persons or institutions .... [Jiudges must be kept mindful of their limita-
tions and of their ultimate public responsibility by a vigorous stream of criticism ex-
pressed with candor however blunt.'" 1962 SuP. CT. REV. ii; 1996 SuP. CT. REV. ii.
Both admonitions were paired with a cautionary word from Judge Learned Hand:
" 'while it is proper that people should find fault when their judges fail, it is only
reasonable that they should recognize the difficulties .... Let them be severely
brought to book, when they go wrong, but by those who will take the trouble to un-
derstand them.'" 1960 SUP. CT. REV. ii; 1962 SUP. CT. REV. ii; 1996 Sup. CT. REV. ii.
67United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 301 (1966) (Stewart, J., dis-
senting).
Ward S. Bowman, Restraint of Trade by the Supreme Court: The Utah Pie
Case, 77 YALE L.J. 70, 84-85 (1967). Bowman also lamented Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962), United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270(1966), FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967), and FTC v. Consolidated
Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965).
Id. at 70 (footnotes omitted).
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cism of Utah Pie, the Court in Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp.0 explained away the case as "an early
judicial inquiry" that "did not purport to set forth explicit, gen-
eral standards for establishing a violation of the Robinson-
Patman Act."7'
The Supreme Court's 1967 opinion in United States v. Ar-
nold, Schwinn & Co.72 is another familiar example. Until the
Court overruled its decision ten years later, Schwinn was the
leading opinion addressing restricted distribution. The Court
adopted a sharp line of illegality: "Under the Sherman Act, it is
unreasonable without more for a manufacturer to seek to restrict
and confine areas or persons with whom an article may be
traded after the manufacturer has parted with dominion over
it."73 The Court applied this test to condemn the imposition of
restraints on distributors' and retailers' rights to dispose of pur-
chased products, while upholding Schwinn's territorial and cus-
tomer restrictions in consignment and agency arrangements
whereby the manufacturer retained title and risk of loss of its
products.'
Schwinn was dissected and rejected by a host of commenta-
tors. A leading critic was Donald Baker, a former Assistant At-
torney General in charge of the Antitrust Division:
What is wrong with Justice Fortas' Schwinn decision is that it is
an exercise in barren formalism. It has (to borrow another of
Justice Fortas' phrases) a "strange red-haired, bearded, one-
eyed man-with-a-limp" quality. It is artificial and unresponsive
to the competitive needs of the real world. An even cursory look
at the case itself makes clear that what we have is unsound an-
titrust policy.7
When the Court reversed itself in Continental T.V., Inc. v.
GTE Sylvania Inc.,76 it observed that Schwinn had been the
subject of continuing controversy in the scholarly journals.77
7 509 U.S. 209 (1993).
71 Id. at 221.
72 388 U.S. 365 (1967), overruled by Continental T.V. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,
433 U.S. 36 (1977).
73 Id. at 379.
74 See id. at 377-78.
7Donald I. Baker, Vertical Restraints in Times of Change: From White to
Schwinn to Where?, 44 ANITRUST L.J. 537, 537 (1975) (citation omitted).
76 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
7Id at 48, 49 nn.13-14 (citing roughly a dozen law review articles, including
Baker's, debating the partial per se approach announced in Schwinn, and a host of
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"The great weight of scholarly opinion has been critical of the
decision ....
By their very nature, consent orders attract much less scru-
tiny than do court opinions. A court opinion is binding precedent
that cries out for attention by scholars and other tribunals. A
good opinion describes the facts, applies applicable legal stan-
dards, and elucidates the reasoning that drives the decision. A
judge is subject to the sobering requirement to announce a win-
ner and a loser, and to justify his or her action in terms that
speak to the litigants and also to the legal community.
Consent orders are merely compromises. Complaints ac-
companying orders set forth some facts, but rarely with the thor-
oughness and impartiality of a good judge issuing a published
opinion. Government staff commentary accompanying consent
orders explain the rationale of the decision to settle,79 but rarely
with the kind of candor and comprehensiveness that one would
expect of a judicial opinion. At best, outsiders gain an under-
standing of agency views of an issue in situations where poten-
tial defendants have been willing to acquiesce in an agreement
for some undisclosed mix of reasons.
In this regard, observers are sometimes better served by a
collegial body such as the FTC than a single-headed agency such
as the Antitrust Division. Commissioners can signal the
strength of their support for particular consent orders by record-
ing votes and publishing dissents, concurrences, and responses.
At times, a consent order may trigger a public exchange of views
that can highlight areas where Commissioners (and likely oth-
ers) disagree. For example, over the past few years, the Com-
mission has initiated several enforcement actions resulting in
consent orders settling charges that various respondents have
engaged in illegal resale price maintenance ("RPM")." The most
federal court cases that had struggled to distinguish or limit Schwinn in ways that
"'are a tribute to judicial ingenuity' ") (quoting Stanley D. Robinson, Recent Anti-
trust Developments: 1974, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 243, 272 n.13 (1975)).
78 I& at 48.
79 The Tunney Act requires the Justice Department to file a "Competitive Im-
pact Statement" and to make available to interested parties "determinative" mate-
rials considered by the department, 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (1994), and the Federal Trade
Commission publishes a non-binding "analysis to aid public comment" with its pro-
posed complaints and orders.
8See American Cyanamid Co., (Consent Order May 12, 1997) (C-3739)
(resulting in three separate statements of commissioners), summarized in 5 Trade
Reg. Rep. (CCH) 24,203 (1997) (proposed consent agreement); New Balance Ath-
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recent of this series of cases, American Cyanamid, involved
charges that the company fixed the resale prices of its agricul-
tural chemical products by offering substantial rebates to its re-
tail dealers on the condition that the dealers sold the company's
chemicals at or above specific prices." The merits of the pro-
posed consent order are vigorously debated in majority and dis-
senting statements, such that it is obvious to anyone reading the
exchange of views that this was a case about which there was
considerable controversy.82 The same consent order, if entered
by the Antitrust Division, might not have advertised its status.
Even at the FTC, however, consent orders reveal the
letic Shoe, Inc., (Consent Order Sept. 10, 1996) (C-3683) (4-1 vote with separate con-
curring and dissenting statements issued by 2 commissioners), summarized in 5
Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) J[ 24,048 (1996) (proposed consent agreement); Reebok Intl,
Ltd., (Consent Order July 18, 1995) (C-3592) (4-1 vote with one dissenting state-
ment), summarized in 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 23,813 (1995) (proposed consent
agreement); Keds Corp., (Consent Order Apr. 1, 1994) (C-3490), summarized in 5
Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 23,463 (proposed consent agreement); Nintendo of Am.,
Inc., (Consent Order Nov. 14, 1991) (C-3350), summarized in [1987-1993 Transfer
Binder] FTC Complaints & Orders (CCH) 22,968 (proposed consent agreement);
Kreepy Krauly, U.S.A., Inc., (Consent Order Dec. 20, 1991) (C-3354), summarized in
[1987-1993 Transfer Binder] FTC Complaints & Orders (CCH) 22,924 (proposed
consent agreement).
"' The complaint alleged that the company maintained two rebate programs for
its retail dealers for a period spanning roughly 5 years. Under these programs, the
company entered into written agreements with its dealers whereby it would pay the
dealers substantial rebates on each sale if the dealers sold the crop protection
chemicals at or above specified minimum resale prices. The pre-rebate prices paid
by the dealers for the crop protection chemicals were equal to the specified mini-
mum resale prices. Thus, under the terms of these agreements, a dealer was not
entitled to, and did not receive, any rebate on sales that were made below the speci-
fied minimum price. Any sales by the dealers below the company's specified mini-
mum resale prices were made at a loss to the dealer. American Cyanamid, 5 Trade
Reg. Rep. (CCH) 24,009.
u When the Commission voted 4-1 to accept the proposed consent order, the
Commission majority's views were set out in an Analysis to Aid Public Comment.
See In re American Cyanamid Co., No. 951-0106 (Jan. 30, 1997) (visited Jan. 28,
1998) <http://www.ftc.gov/os/9701/amercyan.htm>. Commissioner Starek issued a
lengthy dissent in which he accused the majority of seeking "to circumvent the law
of RPM ... laid down by the Supreme Court over the last twenty years." Id.
(dissenting statement of Commissioner Roscoe B. Starek, II). Three members of the
majority responded in a statement of their own. See id. (statements of Chairman
Robert Pitofsky and Commissioners Janet D. Steiger and Christine A. Varney).
Commissioner Mary L. Azcuenaga declined to join either statement, preferring to
let the complaint and consent order speak for themselves. See id. (concurring state-
ment of Commissioner Mary L. Azcuenaga). Three similar separate statements also
accompanied the Commission's issuance of the complaint and consent order in final
form on May 12, 1997. American Cyanamid is further discussed infra at notes 137-
45 and accompanying text.
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agency's views only dimly. Cases may be settled because of re-
source concerns, because the evidence is shaky, because the law
is uncertain, because ample relief has been achieved, or for other
reasons. It would be surprising were an agency ever to be en-
tirely forthcoming about its thinking (and even the most forth-
coming of collegial bodies may have a rainbow of views). Simi-
larly, defendants may settle entirely unmeritorious cases solely
to save resources, or to avoid risking disclosure of unrelated se-
crets, or because the remedy is innocuous. Settlements may be
based on such an array of secret considerations that it is exceed-
ingly difficult to draw firm lessons from them.'
Given all this, it is not surprising that settlements draw
much less academic scrutiny than leading judicial decisions.' A
commentator can read a published opinion, form a view as to its
merits, and know that the opinion may matter because it is
binding precedent. That same commentator would be hard-
pressed to be confident about whether or not a settlement was
wise, and, since the settlement is not precedent, it is of much
' See Robert F. Leibenluft, Government Enforcement and Guidance in Health
Care Antitrust: Maintaining the Balance (visited Jan. 13, 1998) <http://
www.ftec.gov/speeches/other/aba897.htm>:
I urge you to exercise caution in using a consent order as a specific guide to
conduct by persons not covered by the order. Orders should be read in con-
text .... [Mioreover, order provisions should not be read as a strict
"cookbook" guide to conduct. In many cases, the order language may be
more restrictive than what the law requires of others; in a few cases, fol-
lowing the letter of an order may not shield conduct that in a different con-
text could violate the law.
Id.
One of the best efforts to synthesize antitrust principles unmoored to case law
(and to express frustration at the difficulty of doing so) is Richard M. Steuer, Coun-
seling Without Case Law, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 823 (1995). For a perspective worrying
that government agencies are using consent orders to move legal standards ahead of
what case law supports, see Weiner, supra note 3.
" For a notable counter-example, see the symposium on the Antitrust Division's
then-proposed settlement, which (at the time) was under active review in the courts.
Symposium: Microsoft and the United States Department of Justice, 40 ANTITRUST
BULL. 257 (1995); see also Deborah A. Garza, The Court of Appeals Sets Strict Lim-
its on Tunney Act Review: The Microsoft Consent Decree, 10 ANTITRUST No. 1, at 21
(Fall 1995). Two of the few previous consent orders subject to significant scholarly
analysis-the AT&T decree, United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982),
affd sub nom., Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983), and the FTC de-
cree blessing the GM-Toyota joint venture-are reviewed, along with ten litigated
orders, in THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION (John E. Kwoka, Jr. & Lawrence J. White
eds., 1979); see also ROBERT W. CRANDALL, AFTER THE BREAKUP: U.S. TELE-
COMMUNICATIONS IN A MORE COMPETITIVE ERA (1991).
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less obvious importance to the development of the law. There is
a sense that nothing to which parties have agreed can be too ob-
jectionable; yet, in important ways, agencies can use consent or-
ders to signal views and even shape the rules by which private
firms operate. The process works smoothly, in part, because
there is relatively little second-guessing; for that same reason,
however, the evolution of the law is much less rich.
II. LITIGATION IS IMPORTANT TO THE EVOLUTION OF THE LAW
There was a time during the Reagan era when some of my
colleagues jokingly suggested that my antitrust course should be
reclassified as legal history.' Although the suggestion was made
in jest, it made some sense. Antitrust is a singularly illuminat-
ing field in which to watch a form of common law at work." This
process has succeeded in moving and clarifying the law because
of the steady stream of antitrust cases.
Antitrust doctrine provides rich examples of evolution
through case law. We noted above that both Utah Pie and
Schwinn were subjected to successful assault by withering criti-
cism. Other examples are provided by nonprice vertical re-
straints, summary judgment, and the horizontal per se rule.
A. Nonprice Vertical Restraints
The criticism of Schwinn, the opinion that announced a
bright line test declaring that once a firm parted with title to a
good it could not control the reseller's use and subsequent dispo-
sition of the product, had set the stage for GTE Sylvania by
stimulating a flowering of judicial non-adherence to its policies.
Although Schwinn's rule may have sounded neat on paper, in
See generally Robert Pitofsky, The Renaissance of Antitrust, 45 REC. ASSN B.
CITY OF NEW YORK 851 (1990) (commenting on trends in antitrust enforcement);
Thomas Krattenmaker & Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust Merger Policy and the Reagan
Administration, 33 ANTITRUST BULL. 211 (1988) (discussing merger policy and en-
forcement during the Reagan administration).
8 Many courts and commentators have interpreted the Sherman Act "as a
mandate to develop a common law of antitrust." AREEDA & KAPLOW, supra note 62,
at 58. For opposition to this view, see Thomas C. Arthur, Workable Antitrust Law:
The Statutory Approach to Antitrust, 62 TUL. L. REV. 1163, 1163-70, 1224-34 (1988)
(positing that antitrust law should be implemented via operational legal standards);
Thomas C. Arthur, Farewell to the Sea of Doubt: Jettisoning the Constitutional
Sherman Act, 74 CAL. L. REV. 263, 263-72 (1986) (arguing that the judiciary's proper
role is to construe the antitrust statutes as statutes rather than as an open-ended
invitation to make national competition policy).
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practice it proved unworkable. Courts were persuaded to un-
dermine the strict rule as they were presented with compelling
economic justifications for vertical nonprice restraints. First-
sellers were permitted to make recommendations, to require the
passing over of profits made outside assigned territories, and to
impose best-efforts clauses.87 The result was a decade of uncer-
tainty and confusion as lower courts distinguished Schwinn and
applied a rule of reason analysis.8 Finally, the landmark 1977
opinion, Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,89 recog-
nized the new reality and, rejecting suggestions for a narrow
opinion, overruled Schwinn and directed a return to the rule of
reason analysis that governed nonprice vertical restrictions prior
to Schwinn.s° Lower courts no longer had to strain to distinguish
Schwinn in order to apply the rule of reason.
GTE Sylvania stimulated its own uncertainty, to be sure:
just how should one balance intra- and inter-brand competitive
effects? Litigants responded, and a host of courts weighed in,
largely emphasizing inter-brand effects.9' Litigation-generated
discord became the vehicle for evolution to a reasonably well-
understood approach to nonprice vertical restraints.92
8 See, e.g., Superior Bedding Co. v. Serta Assocs., Inc., 353 F. Supp. 1143, 1150-
51 (N.D. Il1. 1972) (upholding pass-over fee to compensate for advertising and sales
expense of licensee in whose territory sales were made); United States v. Topco As-
socs., Inc., 1973-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 74,391, at 93,798 (N.D. Ill.) (permitting pass-
over arrangements for "reasonable compensation" for goodwill created for product's
trademark, provided that they were not used "to achieve or maintain territorial ex-
clusivity").
as See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 26-27
(1977) (citing cases).
"' 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
9 Id. at 47, 59. The Court found that the distinction drawn between sale and
consignment transactions in Schwinn had no sound basis with respect to the com-
petitive impact of each restriction. See id. at 52-54, 57. The Court recognized both
that vertical restrictions can promote interbrand competition by allowing the manu-
facturer to realize efficiencies in the distribution of its products, see id. at 54, and
that the interbrand competition confronting a manufacturer can provide a signifi-
cant check on the exploitation of intrabrand market power. See id. at 52 n.19. The
Court emphasized that departure from the rule of reason "must be based upon de-
monstrable economic effect rather than-as in Schwinn-upon formalistic line
drawing." Id. at 59.
9' See, e.g., 1984 ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 60, at 70-72 (citing
scores of cases following the decision in Sylvania).
"One of the fine chronicles of developments in vertical restraint law is Richard
M. Steuer, The Turning Points in Distribution Law, 35 ANTITRUST BULL. 467 (1990)
(focusing on the application of antitrust law to distribution and marketing by manu-
facturers).
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B. Summary Judgment
For years, the procedural part of antitrust was typified by
Poller.3 Summary judgment (and, by inference, motions to dis-
miss) were seldom appropriate in antitrust cases, or so it was
said.' But although the veneer of Pollers words was preserved,
the underlying reality changed. As courts perceived that anti-
trust cases (and potential treble damages) were leading to ex-
cesses, they started awarding defendants relatively early wins."
When the appropriateness of summary decisions in antitrust
was explicitly recognized in Matsushita," it was more the con-
firmation than creation of a new reality. Matsushita itself may
have been read a little too enthusiastically by some courts,97
which the Court corrected in Kodak.98
C. The Horizontal Per Se Rule
The per se rule against price fixing has been antitrust's cen-
Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464 (1962).See id. at 473 ("[Slummary procedures should be used sparingly in complex
antitrust litigation where motive and intent play leading roles, the proof is largely
in the hands of the alleged conspirators, and hostile witnesses thicken the plot.").
"' See Stephen Calkins, Summary Judgment, Motions to Dismiss, and Other
Examples of Equilibrating Tendencies in the Antitrust System, 74 GEO. L.J. 1065,
1127-30, 1137-39 (1986).
"Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986)
(discussing the requirements for defeating summary judgment motion).
7 See generally 1997 ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 47, at 828
n.424 (citing cases in which lower courts increasingly dismissed antitrust actions on
the ground that plaintiffs claim was not economically plausible or that plaintiff had
not adduced evidence that tended to exclude the possibility of independent action);
see id. at n.426 (citing cases in which lower courts interpreted Matsushita as disa-
vowing Poller's admonition to use summary judgment sparingly in antitrust litiga-
tion).
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs. Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992). The
Court in Kodak explained that the "requirement in Matsushita that the plaintiffs'
claims make economic sense did not introduce a special burden on plaintiffs facing
summary judgment in antitrust cases." Id. at 468. The Court went on to explain that
Matsushita articulated the same "reasonable inference" standard that applies to all
summary judgment motions. See id.
Kodak itself serves as a small example of the clarifying effect of repeated liti-
gation. The Supreme Court's opinion, which was far from a model of transparency,
was read by some as a minor correction and by others as a potential sea change. A
series of lower court decisions have cabined in the opinion and expressed a clear
preference for the former interpretation. See, e.g., Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Dom-
ino's Pizza, Inc., 7 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 71,909, at 80,432 (3d Cir. 1997)
(distinguishing Kodak).
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tral command. The rule was fashioned in a series of cases99 and
enunciated most enthusiastically in United States v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co." Socony's sweeping words were the antitrust
rule, until Broadcast Music transposed the elements of the
equation."°' Before Broadcast Music, it was hornbook law that
arrangements affecting prices were "price fixing" and thus auto-
matically illegal."2 Broadcast Music explained that arrange-
ments that beneficially affected prices were lawful and therefore
could not be "price fixing.""3
This seeming invitation to rethink settled rules roiled the
antitrust waters until calm was restored though clarifying cases.
A lawyer boycott in support of higher prices was condemned per
se in Superior Court Trial Lawyers."'" Standardization of credit
terms was struck down in Catalano."5 A misguided Eleventh
Circuit approval of agreements among competitors and potential
competitors to divide territories was rebuffed summarily by the
Supreme Court in Palmer v. BRG."36 At the Federal Trade
See, e.g., United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 398 (1927)
(recalling the development of the per se prohibition against uniform price-fixing); cf.
United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 86 (1915) ("A person may be guilty of con-
spiring although incapable of committing the objective offense."); Nash v. United
States, 229 U.S. 373, 378 (1913) (indicating that conspiracies under Sherman Act § 1
are not dependent on any overt act for imposing liability).
' 310 U.S. 150, 223, 225 n.59 (1940).
A combination formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising, de-
pressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity ... is ille-
gal per se .... [A] conspiracy to fix prices violates § 1 of the Act though no
overt act is shown, though it is not established that the conspirators had
the means available for accomplishment of their objective, and though the
conspiracy embraced but a part of the interstate or foreign commerce in
the commodity.Id. 01 Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
2 Cf., e.g., A.D. NEALE, THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 34 (2d Cir. 1970) ("Price fixing is illegal per se: no evidence of the reason-
ableness of the prices fixed need be heard by courts or submitted to juries.").
'03 In Broadcast Music, 40,000 authors and composers granted nonexclusive
rights to the American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers and Broad-
cast Music, Inc. to license their musical compositions for a fee. Broadcast Music, 441
U.S. at 5. Licensees (usually radio and television stations) almost always elected to
take a blanket license. The Court held that the blanket license should be judged un-
der the rule of reason, because of the procompetitive efficiencies that flowed from
"the integration of sales, monitoring, and enforcement against unauthorized copy-
right use" and because the blanket license was, in effect, a new product. Id. at 20.
1F FTC v. Superior Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990).
10 Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643 (1980).
10 Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, Inc., 498 U.S. 46 (1990).
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Commission, the per se rule has been applied to professional as-
sociation restrictions that prevented price advertising in Califor-
nia Dental Ass'n,'o7 and restrictions that prevented price compe-
tition on virtually all aspects of conference interpretation
services in International Ass'n of Conference Interpreters.' The
Ninth Circuit affirmed California Dental Ass'n but only on
"quick look" rule of reason grounds, and, again, antitrust law
evolved through litigation.
III. LITIGATION IS IMPORTANT FOR CERTAINTY AND
PREDICTABILITY
Increasingly, in recent years, commentators have compared
United States and European Economic Community ("EEC") anti-
trust/competition law.09 In many respects the two bodies of law
are similar. Article 85 of the Treaty of Rome is a rough counter-
part to Section 1 of the Sherman Act"0 and Article 86 of Section
2;1" both the United States and the EEC have merger control
'07 California Dental Ass'n, (No. 9259), reprinted in Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
9124,007, afftd, 128 F.3d 720 (1997). The challenged rules, inter alia, restricted the
advertising of low prices and discounts. The association argued that the restrictions
were procompetitive because they were intended to protect consumers from unfair
or deceptive advertising. The Commission viewed the restrictions as limiting truth-
ful, non-deceptive price and nonprice advertising, which it considered to be illegal
under a truncated rule of reason and, for the limits on price advertising, under the
per se rule. The court of appeals affirmed on the first ground. See California Dental
Ass'n, 128 F.3d at 727-28.
"8 International Association of Conference Interpreters, (No. 9270), reprinted in
Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 9 24,235 (Feb. 19, 1997) (upholding many nonprice restric-
tions under the rule of reason).
1"9 One notable collection of articles is 22 J. REPRINTS FOR ANTITRUST L. &
ECON. Nos. 1 & 2 (1993), which includes discussions of all of the topics mentioned
herein.
1o Article 85 prohibits agreements, decisions of associations and concerted
practices that may affect trade between member states and which have as their ob-
jective or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the
EEC. Treaty Establishing EEC, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 3, Art. 85 [hereinafter
Treaty of Rome]. Article 85 lists several examples of restrictive agreements, includ-
ing price fixing, production or market limitations, market sharing, imposition of dis-
criminatory trading conditions and certain tie-ins. One of the many good published
comparisons of Article 85 and the Sherman Act is Valentine Korah, From Legal
Form Toward Economic Efficiency-Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty in Contrast to
U.S. Antitrust, in THE ANTITRUST IMPULSE ch. 33 (Theodore Kovaleff ed., 1994).
. Article 86 prohibits any "abuse ... of a dominant position," including by
"directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair
trading conditions," by "limiting production, markets or technical development to
the prejudice of customers," or by "applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent
transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive dis-
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laws. But there are noteworthy differences, too. For example,
under EEC law, a firm that charges excessive or unfair prices
may violate Article 86's prohibition against abuse of its dominant
position."' Another difference is that modern U.S. law focuses
quite sharply on protecting only competition, whereas EEC law
may give greater weight to protecting more diffuse interests.
14
Some of these differences can be understood only by consid-
ering the different enforcement alternatives in the two arenas.
In Europe, almost all enforcement is undertaken by government
agencies, most typically the European Commission ("EC"). Al-
though much discussion has been given to increasing private en-
forcement,".5 it still remains the exception. The incentives for
advantage." Treaty of Rome, 298 U.N.T.S. 3, Art. 86.
112 Under United States' law, the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements
Act of 1976 established premerger notification requirements, including a prescribed
waiting period for large mergers. See 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1994). Similarly in the EEC,
mergers and acquisitions are subject to regulation under the EEC Merger Regula-
tion or merger control laws of the member states. See Council Regulation (EEC) No.
4064189, 1989 O.J. (L 395) 1, corrigendum 1990 O.J. (L 257) 13. The EEC Merger
Regulation also contains mandatory pre-closing notification and waiting period re-
quirements.
" See generally BARRY E. HAWK, II, UNITED STATES, COMMON MARKET AND
INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST: A COMPARATIVE GUIDE 739-48, 872-82 (2d ed. 1996)
[hereinafter B. HAWK, A COMPARATIVE GUIDE] (discussing cases in which the EEC
Court of Justice has held that excessive prices can constitute an abuse of dominant
position).
114 Case law under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, for example, emphasizes the
protection of competition in the marketplace. In contrast, as illustrated by the four
examples incorporated into Article 86, EEC law focuses on conduct that affects a
dominant firm's customers or the ultimate consumers of its products. See Treaty of
Rome, Art. 86(a)-(d); see also B. HAWK, A COMPARATIVE GUIDE, supra note 113, at
743 (considerations of fairness and market integration prompt the EEC to charac-
terize certain conduct as an abuse, while the same conduct might be viewed either
neutrally or even favorably under the Sherman Act if it resulted in efficiencies).
FTC Chairman Robert Pitofsky discussed the different focus of the two anti-
trust regimes when he explained why the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger was
viewed differently on the two sides of the Atlantic:
Many do not appreciate that antitrust authorities in Brussels and in
Washington are enforcing two different statutes with modestly different
emphases. In Europe, the concern is with mergers that increase the lever-
age that can be exercised by a dominant firm and the possible impact of the
merger on competitors .... In the United States, the emphasis is less on
competitors and "competitive leverage," and more on the effect of a merger
on future prices.
Staples and Boeing: What They Say About Merger Enforcement at the FTC, Pre-
pared Remarks of Robert Pitofsky at "Antitrust 1998" (Sept. 23, 1997) (visited Jan.
28, 1998) <http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/pitofsky/staplesspc.htm>.
115 For example, the EC issued a notice clarifying the application of Articles 85
and 86 by member state national courts. Notice on Cooperation Between National
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private enforcement in Europe are strikingly lower than in the
U.S."6 Private enforcement continues to be the statistical back-
bone of antitrust law in the United States."7 Indeed, in the U.S.,
outside of criminal price fixing, government litigation is quite
rare."8 Here, private suits seeking treble damages, sometimes
using the vehicle of class actions, represent the bulk of antitrust
jurisprudence.
The promise or threat (depending on one's point of view) of
private litigation makes United States antitrust law different
from EEC law. In Europe, very general, near-hortatory declara-
tions of law can remain in effect for decades without unduly
alarming private firms. In a very real sense, "law" is only what
is enforced,"' and the EC, as a near-monopolist enforcer, can
adjust the law by invoking broad admonitions only rarely.
This is not true in the United States. Here, uncertainty in
Courts and the Commission in Applying Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty, 1993
O.J. (C 39) 5. That notice explained that the EC does not consider there to be a suf-
ficient Community interest in a competition case when the plaintiff is able to secure
adequate protection of its rights before the national courts. In addition, this notice
suggests that where there is insufficient Community interest, complaints should be
handled in principle by national courts or authorities. The Commission seems likely
to encourage complainants to resort to these bodies. See Automec S.r.l. v. E.C.
Commission, Joined Cases T-24190 & T-28190 1992 E.C.R. 2223 [1992] 5 C.M.L.R.
431 (Ct. First Instance 1992) (affirming the right of the EC to decline complaints by
private parties that raise no significant Community interest and where adequate
redress is available at the national level). The Directorate General IV ("DG IV"), the
EC's competition department, now rejects such complaints. This policy may lead to a
significant increase in the number of private enforcement actions filed in member
state national courts. See Barry E. Hawk & Laraine L. Laudati, Antitrust Federal-
ism in the United States and Decentralization of Competition Law Enforcement in
the European Union: A Comparison, 20 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 18, 45-46 (1996).
116 Although private litigants can sue in member state courts alleging violations
of EEC law and obtain redress, such private suits are unusual. EEC law does not
provide for treble damages (or any monetary damages) and the English Rule applies
(loser pays winner's legal costs). See Ian S. Forrester, Competition Structures for the
21st Century, FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 445, 447, 490-91 (1995); Panel Discussion on
EC Competition and Trade Law, FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 579, 596 (1995) (Professor
Eleanor Fox observed that treble damages in cartel cases would be a strong incen-
tive that would produce a plaintiffs' antitrust bar, which does not currently exist in
the EEC). These differences have retarded the development of a private bar willing
to bring private enforcement suits.
117 In 1996, 781 civil antitrust suits were commenced in United States district
courts. Only 35 cases-less than five percent-were commenced by the Government.
JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 136 (Table C-2) (1996).
"8 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
119 "The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more preten-
tious, are what I mean by the law." Oliver Wendell Holmes, Path of the Law, 10
HARV. L. REV. 457,461 (1897).
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the case law is exploited by private plaintiffs. One trembles at
the prospect of the litigation that would flow were U.S. courts to
announce that high prices are illegal! Indeed, one need only ex-
amine the evolution of both summary judgment standards and
nonprice vertical restraint law, as previously mentioned,120 to
understand how the perception of excessive private litigation can
inspire a drive for certainty and predictability. 12 1 In the United
States, clarity in antitrust law is perceived as a substantial vir-
tue. Antitrust litigation is both a stimulus for and a source of
clarity.
A. Illustrations
The drive for certainty and predictability in U.S. antitrust
law can be seen in many different doctrines. The law of nonprice
vertical restraints and competitor predatory pricing, which are
discussed above, are good examples of litigation as a spur and
means to clarity. Litigation has been less common recently, and
less effective in achieving certainty and predictability, with re-
spect to two other antitrust doctrines, price discrimination, and
resale price maintenance.
Price Discrimination. Although the law of competitor preda-
tory pricing has become quite certain and predictable, other price
discrimination law is strikingly more muddled. The Robinson-
Patman Act" used to be a mainstay of antitrust litigation and
counseling. The Federal Trade Commission and private litigants
brought case after case challenging pricing differences.' 1s The
good and bad news for private sellers of goods is that litigation
has dried up. The last effective government complaint was is-
sued in 1986. 4 Private suits continue, but at a rate far down
120 See supra notes 87-98 and accompanying text.
12' The irony, of course, is that the Schwinn case that triggered a busy decade of
private litigation was a government enforcement case.
15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1994).
For example, the FTC issued 758 Robinson-Patman orders between 1960 and
1972. See F. SCHERER & D. Ross, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND EcoNoMIc
PERFORMANCE 510 (3d ed. 1990).
' See Max Factor & Co., 108 F.T.C. 135 (1986) (FTC accepted consent order
requiring, inter alia, that the manufacturer make its promotional allowances avail-
able to all of its customers on proportionally equal terms). Although in 1988 the FTC
issued complaints against six of the country's largest book publishers, each alleging
Robinson-Patman violations, the agency later dismissed the complaints on public
interest grounds. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc.; MacMillan, Inc.; Hearst Corp.
and William Morrow and Co.; Putnam Berkley Group, Inc.; Simon & Schuster, Inc.;
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from the glory years of the Act.' The result of this neglect is
that Robinson-Patman litigators have little to do; Robinson-
Patman advisors have the unenviable task of giving legal advice
based on a law that is stringent as written (or at least as inter-
preted by dated but still possibly effective court precedents) but
permissive as enforced by government agencies. Consequently,
there is, more likely than not, a wide disparity in the degree of
attention to the Act among sellers of goods in this uncertain legal
regime.
Resale Price Maintenance. The black letter law of resale
price maintenance is reasonably clear: a vertical agreement on
maximum or minimum resale prices is illegal per se. For a time
this was applied with confidence and vigor, subject to a narrow
exception. Colgate stood for the proposition that "[iun the ab-
sence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, the act
does not restrict the long recognized right of trader or manufac-
turer engaged in ... business, freely to exercise his own inde-
pendent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal." 6 This
was interpreted parsimoniously.2 7
Random House, Inc., Nos. 9217-9222 (Sept. 10, 1996), 1996 FTC Lexis 425.
" Recent litigated Robinson-Patman cases have been brought by private par-
ties. 1997 ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 47, at 430. The Supreme
Court's decision in Brooke Group, Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509
U.S. 209 (1993), further reduced private litigants' incentive to allege Robinson-
Patman violations based on predation by competing sellers. Pre-Brooke Group
"primary line" cases-i.e., cases in which victims of the alleged predation are defen-
dant's competitors who allege injury to competition at the seller's level-permitted a
plaintiff to demonstrate injury to competition either directly through market analy-
sis or, more commonly, by inference from the seller's predatory intent. See 1997
ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 47, at 446. The Court made clear in
Brooke Group, however, that liability in a primary line predatory pricing case may
not be founded solely on evidence of subjective intent. See Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at
241. The Court held that a plaintiff who alleges predatory pricing, whether based on
the Robinson-Patman Act or Section 2 of the Sherman Act, must make two key
demonstrations: (1) that the challenged prices of a competitor were "below an ap-
propriate measure of its ... costs," and (2) 'that the competitor had a reasonable
prospect, or, under § 2 of the Sherman Act, a dangerous probability, of recouping its
investment in below-cost prices." Id. at 222, 224. An effort to extend the Court's
analysis to "secondary line" cases (cases brought by disfavored customers) was re-
jected in Chroma Lighting v. GTE Products Corp., 111 F.3d 653 (9th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 118 S. Ct. 357 (1997). See generally David Balto, In Defense of Small Business,
LEGAL TIMEs, Oct. 13, 1997, at 23 (defending Chroma Lighting and other recent
cases).
2" United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919). Under Colgate, a
manufacturer could announce the prices it wanted its dealers to charge and refuse
to sell to dealers who failed to adhere to those prices.
127 See United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 40 (1960); cf PEILLIP
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Gradually the foundation supporting the per se ban on re-
sale price maintenance eroded. First, academic research chal-
lenged some of the underlying assumptions." Then, when GTE
Sylvania was decided, the legal system confronted a sharp con-
trast between two sets of rules: per se illegality for vertical
agreements on price; rule-of-reason treatment and de facto per
se legality for almost all vertical nonprice agreements.
Private litigants had powerful incentives to characterize
challenged restraints as price related (plaintiffs) or nonprice re-
lated (defendants). The courts sought a safety-valve and found it
in the issue of "agreement," by reinvigorating Colgate. If a
manufacturer only suggested prices, courts viewed that as not an
agreement." 9 Likewise, neither requiring that discounts be
passed on".. nor conditioning cooperative advertising benefits on
the dealer's adherence to suggested resale prices constituted an
agreement."' Even if a manufacturer terminated a firm specifi-
cally because it was a discounter, at the request of an unhappy
AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 433, 438 (1967) ("Should Colgate be overruled? ...
Can you reconcile the logic of Parke Davis with the logic of Colgate?"); Robert Pitof-
sky, Is the Colgate Doctrine Dead? Affirmative of the Debate, 37 ANTITRUST L.J. 772
(1968).
See Pauline M. Ippolito, Resale Price Maintenance: Economic Evidence from
Litigation, Bureau of Economics Staff Report, U.S. Federal Trade Commission
(1988); see also S. OPPENHEIM, ET AL., FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS 9 (1977); Robert
Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division
(Part 2), 75 YALE L.J. 373 (1966). But see Cynthia J. Atchison, Comment, Spray-Rite
Service Corp. v. Monsanto Co.: The Justice Department Challenges the Per Se Rule
Against Resale Price Maintenance, 46 U. PITT. L. REv. 171, 187 (1984).
19 Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Co., 465 U.S. 752, 763-64 (1984) (lawful for
a manufacturer to suggest resale list prices to its distributors); Winn v. Edna Hibel
Corp., 858 F.2d 1517, 1520 (11th Cir. 1988) (no agreement if distributors independ-
ently decide to observe suggested resale prices); General Cinema Corp. v. Buena
Vista Distrib. Co., 681 F.2d 594, 597 (9th Cir. 1982) (same); Santa Clara Valley Dis-
trib. Co. v. Pabst Brewing Co., 556 F.2d 942, 945 (9th Cir. 1977) (same).
130 Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 735-36 (1988);
Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 763-64; Acquaire v. Canada Dry Bottling Co., 24 F.3d 401,
409-10 (2d Cir. 1994); Jack Walters & Sons Corp. v. Morton Bldg., Inc., 737 F.2d
698, 706-07 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1018 (1984); Lewis Serv. Center, Inc. v.
Mack Trucks, Inc., 714 F.2d 842, 847 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1226
(1984); AAA Liquors, Inc. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 705 F.2d 1203, 1206-07
(10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 919 (1983); Butera v. Sun Oil Co., 496 F.2d
434, 436 (1st Cir. 1974); In re Magnavox Co., 113 F.T.C. 255, 263, 269-70 (1990).
' In re Nissan Antitrust Litig., 577 F.2d 910, 914-17 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. de-
nied, 439 U.S. 1072 (1979); Magnavox Co., 113 F.T.C. at 263, 269-70; Advertising
Checking Bureau, 109 F.T.C. 146, 147 (1987). But cf. United States v. Playmobil
U.S.A., Inc., 1995-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,000 (1995) (consent judgment prohibited
manufacturer from withholding advertising rebates from discounting dealers).
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full-price competitor who issued an ultimatum, a court would not
find that as an agreement. 132  What might appear to be an
agreement as a matter of common sense was not an agreement
in law.' A cynic would suggest that this presented the best of
all possible worlds for antitrust defendants: resale price main-
tenance agreements were per se illegal, but if a plaintiff ever
successfully proved an agreement, the defeated defendant still
had a solid malpractice suit against its antitrust legal advisor.
A dark cloud entered this rosy world (for defendants) when
the Federal Trade Commission, under the leadership of then-
Chairwoman Janet Steiger, started questioning some resale
pricing arrangements and entering some consent orders." The
states, too, extracted orders-and theirs, unlike the FTC's, in-
cluded payments (usually to charities).' Over the protests of
dissenting Commissioners, FTC orders such as that issued in
"" Business Elecs., 485 U.S. at 735-36 (agreement to terminate dealer "is not
illegal per se unless it includes some agreement on price or price levels"); A-Abart
Elec. Supply v. Emerson Elec. Co., 956 F.2d 1399, 1402-03 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
506 U.S. 867 (1992); Ben Shafall Distrib. Co. v. Mirta de Perales, Inc., 791 F. Supp.
1575, 1583 (S.D. Fla. 1992); Center Video Indus. Co. v. United Media, Inc., No. 90-C-
6387 1992 WL 27006 (N.D. IlM Feb. 10, 1992), affd, 995 F.2d 735 (7th Cir. 1993).
13 Cf., e.g., Jeanery, Inc. v. James Jeans, Inc., 849 F.2d 1148, 1150 (9th Cir.
1988) (insufficient evidence to warrant sending case to jury when manufacturer, in-
ter alia, suggested a retail price and "made clear ... that any retailer who sold below
the suggested resale price would either be terminated ... or would not receive as fa-
vorable treatment from the manufacturer as would complying retailers"); Toys "R"
Us, Inc. v. R.H. Macy & Co., 728 F. Supp. 230, 232, 235 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (finding no
triable issue of fact where defendant retailer "coerced a manufacturer ... to termi-
nate a rival discounting dealer," and where retailer's agent gave one distributor
"permission" to sell a lower quality product line to defendant's discounting competi-
tor, and two distributors, who "were friends[,] ... [and] informed each other of what
they were doing vis a vis Macy").
34 See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
"5 See generally Resale Price Fixing-State Enforcement, 7 Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) 50,146, at 49, 114, 115 (May 17, 1995) (multi-state settlement with Reebok
and Rockport disbursed money pursuant to alternative distribution procedures as
"approved by the Court," permitting states to distribute settlement to a "not-for-
profit corporation and/or a charitable organization with express conditions ensuring
that the funds be utilized to improve, refurbish, renovate and/or provide athletic
facilities, equipment or services"); Connecticut v. Keds Corp., No. 93 Civ. 6718
(S.D.N.Y. 1993); Maryland ex rel. J. Joseph Curran, Jr. v. Mitsubishi Elec. Am., Inc.,
1992-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,743 (D. Md. 1992); Ohio ex rel. Lee Fisher v. Mitsubi-
shi Elec. Am., Inc. 1992-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,744 (D. Md. 1992); State of New
York ex rel. Robert Abrams v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 1991-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
69,513 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); In re Minolta Camera Prods. Antitrust Litig., 668 F. Supp.
456 (D. Md. 1987).
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American Cyanamid,18 untested by litigation, have created a
counter-trend on finding an agreement.
American Cyanamid, the recent, previously-mentioned RPM
case brought by the FTC, is both an example of the way that the
collegial nature of the Commission can highlight the contro-
verted nature of a consent order, and an example of the limita-
tions of consent orders in achieving certainty and predictability.
According to the complaint, issued by a 4-1 vote, American Cy-
anamid ("Am Cy") violated the Federal Trade Commission Act
when, (1) "[p]ursuant to ... written agreements," Am Cy "offered
to pay [its] dealers substantial rebates on each sale if the dealers
sold Am Cy's crop protection chemicals at or'above the specified
minimum resale prices" (which were equal to the wholesale
prices the dealers paid); and (2) "[t]he dealers overwhelmingly
accepted Am Cy's offer by selling at or above the specified mini-
mum prices."'37 The Commission's order prohibits Am Cy, for 20
years,'38 from "[c]onditioning the payment of any rebate or other
incentive to any dealer, in whole or in part, directly or indirectly,
on the resale price."3 9 The Commission's "analysis to aid public
comment" explains that Am Cy's "conditioning of financial pay-
ments on dealers' charging a specified minimum price amounted
to the quid pro quo of an [illegal] agreement on resale prices. " ""
On the other hand, the analysis declares that the order's prohi-
bition of conditioning payments "should [not] be construed to
prohibit lawful cooperative advertising programs."'
'26 See supra note 81-82 and accompanying text.
17 In re American Cyanamid Co., Complaint (C-3739) 9 5 (visited Jan. 28, 1998)
<httg/lwvw.ftc.gov/os/9705/C3739cmp.htm>.
A Commission policy statement explains that "core provisions" should last 20
years, whereas "supplemental provisions" should last 10.
Core provisions prohibit practices that would be unlawful whether used by
parties subject to the order at issue or by other similarly situated persons
or entities .... Supplemental provisions are intended to prevent a respon-
dent or defendant from repeating a law violation or to mitigate the effects
of prior illegal conduct. Such provisions either prohibit or restrict conduct
that would be lawful if engaged in by parties not subject to the order at is-
sue or impose an affirmative obligation not otherwise required by law.
Policy Statement Regarding Duration of Competition and Consumer Protection Or-
ders, 60 Fed. Reg. 42,569, 42,570 nn.1, 2 (1995).
m In re American Cyanamid Co., Decision and Order (C-3739), Part H(A)
(visited Jan. 12, 1998) <http:/www.ftc.gov/os/9705/C3739d&o.htm>.
140 American Cyanamid Company, Analysis to Aid Public Comment, (No. 951-
0106) (Proposed Consent Agreement, Feb. 11, 1997), 62 Fed. Reg. 6255, 6256 (1997).
SId- at 6257.
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Three members of the four-Commissioner majority re-
sponded to a dissent by Commissioner Starek by emphasizing
that Am Cy and its distributors entered into "written agree-
ments" for Am Cy to "pay the dealer to adhere to the manufac-
turer's specified resale price."'42 Commissioner Starek responded
that the "complaint in this case indicates that the Commission is
willing-despite the clear warnings of Colgate and Monsanto to
the contrary-to infer the existence of per se illegal RPM
'agreements' solely from the dealers' unilateral response to Am
Cy's 'offer.' "' He warned darkly that "as a result of today's de-
cision, the business community may be left wondering how the
Commission can-and whether it will-maintain the functional
distinction it currently draws between, on the one hand, rebate-
pass-through provisions and cooperative advertising programs ...
and, on the other hand, other types of rebate programs that
similarly impose restrictive conditions on the buyer."' Com-
missioner Azcuenaga, concurring in the Commission's decision,
wrote separately to declare that her substantive views were
"contained entirely within" the complaint and consent order.
Now, two of the three Commissioners who co-authored the three-
Commissioner statement have retired from the Commission. Al-
though each of the five Commissioners sought conscientiously to
perform his or her assigned responsibilities, the very nature of
the consent-agreement process is relatively unconducive to
achieving certainty and predictability.'
The greatest pressure to avoid finding an agreement has
been in vertical arrangements limiting maximum prices. Al-
though maximum prices can, in theory, harm consumers,' the
142 American Cyanamid Company;, Statement of Chairman Robert Pitofsky and
Commissioners Janet D. Steiger and Christine A. Varney, (No. 951-0106) (Proposed
Consent Agreement, Feb. 11, 1997), 62 Fed. Reg. 6255, 6257 (1997).
143 American Cyanamid Company;, Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Ro-
scoe B. Starek, HI, (No. 951-0106) (Proposed Consent Agreement, Feb. 11, 1997), 62
Fed. Reg. 6255, 6259 n.6 (1997).
14 Id. at 6259.
1 Similarly, it has been oft-noted that merger review has moved from court
litigation to bureaucratic processing. See, e.g., supra note 3 and accompanying text.
The antitrust agencies have turned to Guidelines in an admirable effort to commu-
nicate their views with and without the other agencies. However, standards built
solely on guidelines and consents are something like a house built on sand: it may
look lovely and work splendidly, but it does not carry with it the reassurance that it
will not be undone by some stiff challenge.
'40 See Ippolito, supra note 128, at 6-23. The economic literature identifies a va-
riety of rationales for imposing vertical restraints, but finds only some to be anti-
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likelihood of such harm seems remote as a matter of both eco-
nomics and common sense. Some of the cases that have
stretched the furthest to avoid finding an agreement have been
in the context of maximum price arrangements. 47 Now, happily,
private litigation has provided a vehicle for resolving whether
maximum RPM is per se illegal.' The federal antitrust agencies
have weighed in on the issue, arguing for rule-of-reason treat-
ment for maximum price controls.49 This observer hopes that
the Court will agree and remove this most extreme incentive to
avoid finding an agreement.' 50
B. Benefits of Certainty and Predictability
When the drive for certainty and predictability succeeds, the
legal system enjoys certain benefits, albeit with a loss of the fine-
tuning that can flow from application of more general admoni-
tions. Market participants obviously benefit from the ability to
plan their actions with confidence about likely legal conse-
quences. Two less direct benefits also are important: facilitating
private antitrust enforcement and insulating government en-
forcement.
1. Facilitating private enforcement
When rules are clear anyone can enforce them, including
private parties. The availability of private enforcement allows
all types of private firms, large and small alike, to have their day
in court. The private right of action is preserved because the
drive for certainty and predictability helps prevent it from being
abused.
Although the small firm may be the prototypical antitrust
plaintiff, large firms also can benefit, as antitrust plaintiffs, from
competitive, primarily by facilitating collusive pricing by suppliers or resellers. See
147 See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
148 See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 93 F.3d 1358 (7th Cir. 1996), vacated, 118 S. Ct.
275 (1997).
149 Brief for the United States and the Federal Trade Commission as Amici Cu-
riae Supporting Reversal, State Oil Co. v. Khan, 118 S. Ct. 275 (1997) (No. 96871).
In the interests of full disclosure it should be noted that the author's name is on
that brief.
Since Professor Calkins delivered this speech, the Supreme Court has re-
jected the per se illegality of vertical maximum price fixing (announced in Albrecht
v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968)), in favor of a return to the rule of reason ap-
proach advocated by Professor Calkins. See State Oil, 118 S. Ct. at 279, 283.
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clear rules. For instance, in tiny Vicksburg, Mississippi, which
has two hospitals and several physician clinics, a proposed
merger that was structured to align the two largest clinics with
one of the town's hospitals was questioned by the disfavored
hospital. The disfavored hospital challenged the suspect affilia-
tion and had its day in court to argue that the prevailing merger
standards made the proposed merger illegal. No one suggested
that there was anything inappropriate about merger standards
being invoked by a hospital that was part of the largest for-profit
hospital chain in the country, Columbia-HCA ("Columbia"). Co-
lumbia lost before the district court (the case is on appeal), but it
had an opportunity to be heard." Antitrust litigation can play
an important role by providing a safety-valve for such disputes.5 2
2. Insulating government enforcement
Clear rules, and the safety-valve of private litigation, help to
insulate government enforcement, as well. The response, "We
are law enforcers, enforcing laws that Congress wrote," is a pow-
erful shield to outside pressure.53
The EC has a less powerful shield, at least with respect to
" See HTI Health Servs., Inc. v. Quorum Health Group, Inc., 960 F. Supp. 1104
(S.D. Miss.), injunction denied, appeal dismissed, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5234 (S.D.
Miss. Mar. 27, 1997).
152 Although some antitrust predictability is essential to the existence of private
enforcement, merger law, which has become something of a regulatory specialty,
has moved away from bright lines. Although this greater sensitivity can improve
particular decisions, it also permits courts to reason, as this one did, that the lessen-
ing of competition between two clinics is beneficial because it "Will foster coopera-
tive, rather than divisive, efforts among the doctors" with respect to recruitment of
specialists and issuance of certificates of need for specialized equipment. Id. at 1143.
13 This view is most closely associated with former AAG Thomas E. Kauper. See
Thomas E. Kauper, The Justice Department and the Antitrust Laws: Law Enforcer
or Regulator?, 35 ANTITRUST BULL. 83, 114-15 (1990) [hereinafter Kauper, Law En-
forcer or Regulator]; see also Thomas E. Kauper, Politics and the Justice Depart-
ment: A View from the Trenches, 9 J.L. & POL. 257, 258 (1993) [hereinafter Kauper,
View from the Trenches]; Thomas E. Kauper, The Role of Economic Analysis in the
Antitrust Division Before and After the Establishment of the Economic Policy Office:
A Lawyer's View, 29 ANTITRUST BULL. 111, 130-32 (1984); Thomas E. Kauper, Com-
petition Policy and the Institutions of Antitrust, 23 S.D. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (1978). Profes-
sor Kauper has worried that "[tihe public is now more dependent on the Division's
own judgments, and upon its willingness to keep the exercise of its discretion within
the bounds of legislative intention and established doctrine." Kauper, Law Enforcer
or Regulator, supra, at 117. He has wondered in print whether the increasingly
regulatory nature of government antitrust enforcement might not call for transfer of
the Division's civil antitrust responsibility to the more institutionally regulatory
FTC. See id. at 121-22.
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press criticism, precisely because it has considerably more lati-
tude in its prosecutorial discretion."M Commentators have peri-
odically suggested that political considerations played a role in
one decision or another by the EC. Most recently, the EC ex-
pressed serious concerns about the proposed Boeing Company
acquisition of McDonnell Douglas Corporation, particularly be-
cause of the merger's potential effect on Europe's Airbus Indus-
trie consortium, Boeing's primary rival in the global market for
commercial aircraft manufacturing.'55 Only after the EC leveled
threats that it would impose billions of dollars in fines did Boe-
ing offer several key concessions-including termination of Boe-
ing's long-term exclusive contracts with U.S. air carriers-in or-
der to gain EC approval.5 6 EC approval came only after vigorous
lobbying by the U.S. government.'57 To the end, the EC was
plagued by charges of protectionism (which it denied). 58
In the United States, in contrast, there has been a general
impression that politics plays relatively little role in antitrust
enforcement. This difference is attributed, at least in part, to
the institutional differences in the way antitrust law enforcers in
'" Institutional differences between the U.S. and EEC partially explain the lat-
ter's greater willingness to introduce social and political values directly into the an-
titrust analysis. Because the EC is the executive arm of the EEC, social and political
values in the EEC play a larger role in antitrust policy in that forum. In this coun-
try, the Department of Justice comprises only one part of the executive branch.
Various economic, social, and political policies and constituencies are under the di-
rection of other executive departments and agencies. In contrast, the EC is the ex-
ecutive arm of the EEC and has responsibility over all policies and constituencies.
This broader mandate necessarily involves the EC in social and political issues and
policies. See generally B. HAWK, A COMPARATIVE GUIDE, supra note 113, ch. 7.
1s See Bruce Clark, Brussels Averts Crisis by Agreeing Boeing Merger, FIN.
TIMES, July 24, 1997, at A-24 (reporting EC's approval of Boeing/McDonnell Douglas
merger, ending five months of disagreement which was reported to have threatened
a trade war); Jeff Cole, et al., Boeing Deal Close to European Approval, WALL ST. J.,
July 23, 1997, at A-3; Steven Pearlstein, Boeing Yields to Key EU Demand to Win
Approval of McDonnell Deal, WASH. POST, July 23, 1997, at D-10. Despite FTC
clearance for the deal, the EC continued to express concern about the transaction
for nearly an additional month. See John R. Wilke & Jeff Cole, Boeing, McDonnell
Douglas Deal Gains U.S. Antitrust Clearance, WALL ST. J., July 2, 1997, at B-4;
Nancy Dunne & Emma Tucker, Boeing and McDonnell Merger Approved By US
Regulators, FIN. TIMES, July 2, 1997, at A-28.
' See Dunne & Tucker, supra note 155, at A-28.
,57 See Edmund L. Andrews, Boeing Concession Averts Trade War With Europe,
N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 1997, at A-1 (speculating on other factors attributable to the
EC's approval); Jeff Cole, et al., Boeing-McDonnell Merger Clears Hurdle, WALL ST.
J., July 24, 1997, at A-2 (same).
" See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 157, at A-1.
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the two arenas are structured. Unlike the EC, which is the ex-
ecutive branch of the EEC and has sole responsibility for compe-
tition policy and enforcement, the U.S. Antitrust Division and
the FTC are usually considered to be more insulated from politi-
cal influences.159
The public perception of U.S. antitrust enforcement inde-
pendence may have become less robust as the agencies have been
increasingly seen as regulators.' For instance, the Consumer
Project on Technology has used a web site and e-mail publicly to
lobby the agencies on specific matters and to permit easier citi-
zen submission of enforcement views. 6' Both the Antitrust Di-
vision and the Commission now accept consumer complaints via
e-mail.'62 During the Commission's investigation of the proposed
'r9 See supra note 153 and accompanying text; see also e.g., Kauper, View From
the Trenches, supra note 153, at 257 (distinguishing between executive oversight of
policies and intervention in particular cases). But cf. William F. Shughart II & Rob-
ert D. Tollison, The Positive Economics of Antitrust Policy: A Review Article,
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 5 (1985), 39-57 (antitrust is
shaped by the forces of interest-group politics); THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF
ANTITRUST: THE PUBLIC CHOICE PERSPECTIVE (Fred S. McChesney & William F.
Shughart II, eds. 1995) (advocating a public-choice perspective on antitrust en-
forcement); WILLIAM F. SHUGHART II, ANTITRUST POLICY AND INTEREST-GROUP
POLITICS 36 (1990).
Each of the two antitrust agencies are subject to separate influences. The Anti-
trust Division is part of the executive branch, so the Assistant Attorney General for
Antitrust reports to the Attorney General and, indirectly, to the President. The
Federal Trade Commission enjoys the independence from direct executive control
associated with its special status, but it may be correspondingly more prone to Con-
gressional influence and interference. See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASS'N COMM'N TO
STUDY THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, REPORT 98 (1969) (reporting the separate
statement of Richard A. Posner). The agency is supposed to respond to proper Con-
gressional oversight, but ensuring that oversight is proper is no easy task. See Re-
port of the American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law Special Committee to
Study the Role of the Federal Trade Commission, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 43, 107-12
(1989).
160 See First, supra note 3, at 12 (expressing concern about "bureaucratic en-
forcement").
'61 See Letter from James Love, et al., to FTC Chairman Robert Pitofsky, et al.,
"Using The Internet To Enhance Public Participation In Merger Reviews" (Mar. 5,
1997) (on file with author) (calling on the Commission "to raise the curtain of se-
crecy which shrouds the FTC's merger review process," because "the FTC is influ-
enced too much by a handful of large firms who can afford high priced antitrust
counsel and experts, and too little by the persons who are most often adversely im-
pacted by the mergers - consumers and small businesses"); E-mail from James Love
to internet mailing list "Who to Contact on Boeing'McDonnell Douglas Merger"
(Apr. 28, 1997) (on file with author) (supplying voice and fax numbers and e-mail
addresses).
'62 Competition complaints are received by the FTC at antitrust@ftc.gov, and by
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Staples-Office Depot merger, for a time, the Commission in-
cluded a special "hot link" on its Home Page for receipt of com-
ments about that proposed transaction-and the agency received
literally thousands of e-mail comments." Although I am per-
sonally confident that everyone involved in the agency review
made decisions solely on the merits e-mail traffic to the Con-
sumer Project on Technology suggested that some observers
thought that consumerist pressure was effective.'"
There also have been some striking recent efforts to turn to
Capitol Hill in an attempt to influence antitrust outcomes. For
example, the Butterworth-Blodgett Hospital defendants went di-
rectly to Congressional budget authorities in an effort to win on
the Hill what they were uncertain of winning at the agency."
Also, when Anne Bingaman resigned as head of the Antitrust
Division, the confirmation of her successor was the subject of
rather matter-specific political debate. Joel Klein was confirmed
only after considerable Congressional wrangling about telecom-
munications enforcement actions Klein had taken as acting
AAG. 166
the Antitrust Division at newcase@usdoj.gov or antitrust@usdoj.gov.
1 See Yahoo - FTC Opens Staples Case to Internet Comment, <httpi/
www.yahoo.com/headlines/970314/business/stories/staples_.html> (quoting James
Love, of the Center for the Study of Responsive Law, as responding, "[aiwesome ....
I believe[] this is the first time the FTC has ever used the Internet to seek consumer
comments on a merger"); see also E-mail from James Love to internet mailing lists
Statement by Ralph Nader DOJ's Microsoft Action (Oct. 20, 1997) (on file with
author) ("The Consumer Project on Technology recently circulated a letter about the
browser issue on the Internet .... Over 1,500 computer users and high tech busi-
nesses urged the Department of Justice to take steps that could prevent Microsoft
from using anticompetitive practices to monopolize the Browser market .... ").
' Cf., e.g., E-mail from Audrie Krause to internet list (Oct. 20, 1997) (on file
with author) (describing the Justice Department's announcement of its lawsuit
against Microsoft as "a sign that consumer pressure is having an impact").
1 See Senate Judiciary Panel Members Oppose Rider on FTC Review of Hospi-
tal Merger, 73 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 307 (Sept. 25, 1997) (proposed
rider to appropriations bill).
1 See Senate Confirms Klein to Run Antitrust Division, 73 Antitrust & Trade
Reg. Rep. (BNA) 69, 69 (July 17, 1997) (noting that various Senators placed holds on
the nomination because of Klein's "views and actions as Acting Chief of the Divi-
sion"). There also are reports of efforts to use politicians to influence the consumer
protection activities of the FTC. See FTC Is Backing Off Bid to Ease Standards for
'Made in U.S.A.,' WALL. ST. J., Oct. 17, 1997, at B-5 (reporting that the FTC would
revise the proposal that had "drawn sharp criticism from lawmakers and labor un-
ions"). The press reported that the Commission's complaint against R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co. was stimulated, in part, by Congressional urging. See WALL ST. J., May
29, 1997, at B-1 (reporting that the agency received bipartisan petitions from 67
House members and 7 senators). The Commission had voted, 3-2, to issue an admin-
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One worries about whether the increasing perception of the
antitrust agencies as regulators may already be eroding the
strength of their protection from political pressure. My personal
view is that pressure of any sort has historically been unproduc-
tive at the agencies; my personal hope and belief is that it will
continue to be unproductive. To the extent that the agencies be-
come regulators rather than litigators, however, pressure (and
calls for political accountability) are sure to increase.
IV. CONCLUSION
As discussed above, antitrust litigation is important for
many reasons, including because some decisions are wrong, be-
cause of the importance of litigation to the evolution of the law,
and because of the importance of certainty and predictability.
That litigation is important does not mean that any particular
case should be tried; when government enforcers can achieve full
relief without litigation they cannot very well proceed to trial,
and, even short of achieving full relief, the potential costs and
benefits of litigation may make settlement the obvious choice.'67
Nonetheless, appreciating the importance of litigation may affect
decisions, for two reasons.
First, the benefits that can flow from litigation should be re-
garded as a kind of externality that the government properly
should take into consideration. A case may yield benefits not
just with respect to the conduct and parties at issue, but also
with respect to other conduct and other market participants, and
even with respect to the legal system itself. A government
agency toting up costs and benefits should consider these
"external" benefits as part of its calculus.
istrative complaint against the tobacco giant, challenging the company's "Joe
Camel" advertising campaign. The agency alleged that the ad campaign is an
"unfair practice" under Section 5 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45. See generally John
M. Broder, FTC Charges Joe Camel Ad Illegally Takes Aim at Minors, N.Y. TIMES,
May 29, 1997, at A-1 (quoting company executive's belief that "cold chill of potential
regulation" will affect other industries, as well); Bruce Ingersoll, Joe Camel Ads Il-
legally Target Kids, FTC Says, WALL ST. J., May 29, 1997, at B-1 (discussing regula-
tory assaults on tobacco company and Clinton administration's commitment to stop
those who glamorize tobacco products in a manner that influences children).
167 The FTC's most recent attempt to engage in antitrust litigation was foiled
when parties to a planned merger abandoned the transaction the morning the
hearing was to begin. See Medical Equipment Supplier Shuts Off Merger Plan in
Light of FTC Challenge, 73 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 310, 310-11 (Sept.
25, 1997).
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Second, an adjudicative agency such as the FTC should
strive to make administrative adjudication an effective alterna-
tive to settlement. It is important that respondents know that
they may decline to settle a matter and test the agency's allega-
tions in an efficient, cost-effective, and fair proceeding. Simi-
larly, it is important that agency staff know that meritorious
claims can be tested through expeditious adjudication, so staff
are free in fact to decline to accept inadequate settlements.
In part because litigation is so important, the FTC recently
took steps to make administrative litigation operate more
smoothly and expeditiously at the agency. Last fall, the Com-
mission announced sweeping amendments to the rules of prac-
tice that govern its adjudicative docket. These amendments es-
tablished tighter deadlines, 68  attempted to minimize
unnecessary discovery delays 69 and delays at trial,7 and created
a new "fast track""" procedure that will allow those respondents
16m For example, the Administrative Law Judge ("AL") must now issue his de-
cision within one year after service of the administrative complaint. See Initial De-
cision, 61 Fed. Reg. 50,640, 50,650 (1996) (codified at 16 C.F.R. § 3.51(a)). In addi-
tion, the amended rules impose tighter interim deadlines during early phases of the
proceeding. See Answer to Complaint, 61 Fed. Reg. 50,640, 50,646 (1996) (codified at
16 C.F.R. § 3.12(a)) (requiring that an answer must be filed within 20, rather than
30 days following service of the admini trative complaint); Prehearing Procedures,
61 Fed. Reg. 50,640, 50,646 (1996) (codified at 161 C.F.R. § 3.21) (requiring that a
scheduling conference between the ALJ and the litigants be held within 7 days after
the filing of the answer and the AL's scheduling order be issued within 2 days
thereafter).
169 Under the modified rules, the parties must make certain initial disclosures
within five days after the filing of the answer, without awaiting a formal discovery
request from the other party. This initial joint disclosure requirement parallels Rule
26(a) in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Also, as in federal court, discovery re-
quests no longer must be preapproved. The amended rules also encourage greater
use of prehearing and status conferences, and require consultation between the
parties before the mandatory scheduling conference. In addition, each party is now
limited to 25 interrogatories, consistent with federal court practice. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 33.
171 To minimize unnecessary delays at trial, the ALJ is now required to hold a
final prehearing conference at which counsel are to submit proposed stipulations of
law, fact, or admissibility of evidence; exchange exhibit and witness lists; and desig-
nate testimony to be presented by deposition. Although not explicitly included in the
rule amendments, the Commission included in its statement accompanying the
amendments a suggestion that the AUJs also consider other techniques for expedit-
ing administrative trials. For example, ALJs are encouraged to allow parties to
submit direct examination of expert witnesses in writing, in lieu of live direct ex-
amination (reserving live testimony for cross-examination). See Techniques for Ex-
pediting Evidentiary Hearings, 61 Fed. Reg. 50,640, 50,641 (1996).
1 The new fast track schedule is made available to respondents in certain ad-
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who elect this expedited schedule to have their cases fully re-
solved by the Commission within thirteen months. All of these
changes are designed to make litigation a more viable option at
the FTC.
That litigation is a viable option helps both complaint coun-
sel and respondents alike, because neither needs to contemplate
an unjustified settlement simply to avoid a litigation swamp.'
It also helps in the development of certain and predictable anti-
trust standards and enforcement.
I like to think that Lewis Bernstein would have approved.
ministrative proceedings where a federal district court has granted the agency's re-
quest for a preliminary injunction in a collateral federal court proceeding. See Fast
Track Proceedings, 61 Fed. Reg. 50,640, 50,645 (1996) (codified at 16 C.F.R.
§ 3.11A).
172 The streamlined procedures for administrative litigation may also lead to
more rapid settlements. For example, in September 1996, the Commission filed an
administrative complaint against Exxon, challenging the company's advertising
campaign that cars would run better on higher-octane gasoline. Within roughly nine
months, the FTC had reached a negotiated settlement with the respondent, taking
the case out of the agency's administrative docket. See generally Exxon Corp.,
Analysis to Aid Public Comment (No. 9281) (Proposed Consent Agreement, June 18,
1997), 62 Fed. Reg. 35816 (1997); Exxon, FTC Reach Settlement on Ads for High-
Octane Gas, WALL ST. J., June 25, 1997, at A-6; David Sega], Taming the Octane of
the Ads, Exxon Agrees to TV Spots to Soften Gasoline Claims, WASH. POST, June 25,
1997, at C-11; see also Quaker State Corp., Analysis to Aid Public Comment (No.
9280) (Proposed Consent Agreement, July 17, 1997), 62 Fed. Reg. 40530 (1997); Troy
Flint, Slick 50 Maker Settles with FTC, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, July 24, 1997, at
1C (proposed consent agreement with Quaker State issued about one year after
administrative complaint issued by the FTC).
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